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PREFACE 
The po1;i.tics of the young republic were marked by the fear of an 
all powerful government on the one han~ and by anxieties that govern-
ment might have insufficient power on the other. This ambivalence 
not only divided Congress but created inner tensions within the members 
themselves as to how to achieve a proper balance. The national politi-
cal career of Artemas Ward provides a particularly illuminating example 
of that tension. 
After a long career in provincial politics, Ward moved into the 
national political circle at a time when greater powers for the Congress 
were deemed by many as essential to the further prosecution of the 
Revolution. An ardent patriot, Ward was also fiercely devoted to the 
preservation of a social order in Massachusetts which he believed would 
be destroyed by either over-centralization or public licentiousness. 
The resolution of the conflict between these two extremes in the 
political career of Artemas Ward elucidates one important facet of the 
politics of the new nation. 
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my advisor, Professor H. 
James Henderson, who generously gave of his time and knowledge to help 
me in every stage of research and writing of this thesis. His patience, 
encouragement, and criticism, helped me through many difficult portions 
of the work. Professor Theodore Agnew also offered valuable criticism 
of the chapters and helped me to articulate my thoughts. Professors 
iii 
Henderson and Agnew necessarily share in whatever value this thesis 
may have but the respon$ibility for factual error or misinterpretation 
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"I knew General Ward well," wrote Timothy Dwight and 11had a very 
fair opportunity to learn his character. 1i He then went on to describe 
Ward as one "possessed of an excellent understanding, directed chiefly 
to the practical aspects of mankind, as being, frank ••• undisguised ••• 
of few words ••• inflexible integrity ••• unwarping public spirit and a 
fixed adherence to what he thought right. His reverence for the 
1 
Christian religion was entire, and his life adorned its precepts.." 
This was an accurate assessment of the General's character, for he was 
never one to "shift about like a weathercock with every breath of 
wind, 112 and though he encouraged his sons to better their positions in 
the world it was never to be at the expense of their "politics and 
religion. 113 Indeed Ward I s deep religious conviction and determination 
to do what was right were the crucial ingredients of his political 
philosophy. Just six months before the death of General Ward his good 
1Timothy Dwight, Travels in New England and New York, eds., 
Barbara M. Solortlon and PatriciaM. King (Cambridge;-1969), I, 269. 
2ward to Henry Dana Ward, March 3, 1795. Frederick L. Allis Jr. 
and Bruce R. Pruitt, eds., The Artemas ~ Papers (6 vols. microfilm; 
Boston, 1967). Reel 5, Unbound correspondence, frame 126. Hereinafter 
cited as Papers. The Papers of Artemas Ward are sometimes undated or 
unaddressed, and there:f;ore, my citations will include the number of the 
reel, the volume number and the frame number of the papers used. The 
designation will be R _, V _, f.(s) 
3 Ward to Henry Dana Ward, February 25, 1795, ibid., f. 123. 
1 
friend Enoch Huntington, of Middlesex, while lamenting the passing of 
their generation, referred to Ward as 11 one of the most experienced, 
aged and wise, faithful and long tried friends of our religion and 
4 
country.'' The assessments of Dwight a,nd Huntington are generally 
accepted·. For while historians have criticized Ward's generalship, 
5 none have found reason to attack his chara,ct~r. The few biographies 
that deal with Ward are weak. The reasons for these weaknesses are 
three-fold. Foremost, the papers of Artemas Ward were very widely 
dispersed until they were collected and published in a microfilm 
edition by the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1967. In addition, 
biographers have chosen to pose Ward essentially as a military figure 
2 
to the neglect of his congressional career, and, finally, they have been 
preoccupied with rescuing Ward's military reputation. This preoccupa-
tion, however, is quite underst~ndable because descriptions of Ward's 
military career have been somet~mes vindictive and often inaccurate. 
One historian described Ward as. a "mild village deacon sort of man ••• 
too fat to mount a hor~e, 116 while another erroneously claimed that 
7 
"Ward had never had any battle experience whate'(er. 11 Richard Alden 
in The American Revolution, 177 5-1783 states that i.t was clearly 
4 Enoch Huntington to Ward, April 4, 1800, Papers R 3, V 6, fs. 
398-399. 
5william v. Wells, Life and Public Se~vices of Samuel. Adams, (Bos-
ton, 1888), p. 307: 11The Ar.my of New England, however, wa~ suffering 
for want of a competent leader. Ward, who was commander-in-chief was 
manifestly unfitted for the position, and yet the removal of a man whose 
blameless character was universally admitted was a matter of no little 
delicacy." 
6william E. Woodward, George Washington: The Image and the Man, 
(New York, 1926), p. 259. 
7Francis R. Bellamy, The. Private Life . .£!. George _Washington, (New 
York, 1951), p" 191. 
3 
"evident, however, that Ward's abilities were hardly equal to the duties 
of that [commander-in-chief] office. 118 
Charles Martyn's The Life of Artemas Ward: First Commander-in-
Chief of the American Revolution is the one full-length biogrqphy of 
Artemas Ward. This book, though better than anything written about 
Ward before or since its appearance in 1921, suffers from oversimplifi-
... 
cation. Martyn's attention to features of Ward's career other than 
military is the greatest strength of his work. Percy H. Epler' s 
Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart traces Ward's chief military 
activities with special attention directed toward his command at 
Cambridge, the siege of Boston, and the Dorchester Heights campaign. 
Epler's effort also suffers fro~ its narrow scope and a preoccupation 
with rescuing Ward's military reputation. 
Andrew H. Ward treats Ward mainly as a military fi~ure in The 
History of the Town of Shrewsbury from its settlement in 1717 !2, 1829, 
but the book is nonetheless extremely useful to those interested in 
the Ward family history and the General's involvement in the affairs 
of Shrewsbury and Worcester. Ward had a distinguished judicial career 
in Massachusetts. William T. Davis's compendium History of the 
Judiciary of Massachusetts Including the Plymouth and Massachusetts 
Colonies, the Province of the Massachusetts Bay and the Commonwealth 
is valuable as a source for early Massachusetts court ..structure and 
procedure. 
Artemas Ward, an important military commander of the American 
Revolution, also deserves attention as a political figure. The sim-
8Richard Alden, The American Revolution, 1775-1783 (New York, 
1954), p. 30. 
plicity of his political philosophy applied to sometimes complex 
political situations is useful in illuminating the ways abstract 
political thought was applied in practice. Chapter II of this thesis, 
titled "Artemas Ward 1727-1777, 11 is a brief biographical sketch of 
Ward's 'early life and military career up through November 1777, when 
Ward retired from active military life. The chapter is included to 
explain the General's somewhat parochial views, his attachment to 
things New EngLand, and his incessant striving to preserve the Massa-
chusetts puritan-republican social order •. Every attempt has been 
made to avoid unnecessary repetition, though I have drawn rather 
heavily on the first chapters of Martyn's book. The rest of the 
4 
paper is then concerned with Ward's political career in the Continental 
and Federal Congressese 
CHAPTER II 
ARTEMAS WARD 1727-1777 
Rising from a sick bed on a brisk April morning in 1775, the 
portly Colonel Artemas Ward traveled on horseback from Shrewsbury to 
Cambridge to assume command of forces raised by the Second Massachu-
setts Provincial Congress. Ward left Shrewsbury at dawn on April 20 
and by hard riding reached Cambridge the same day, took charge of 
assembled forces, and became first commander-in-chief of the American 
Revolution. On May 19 Colonel Ward was officially commissioned by the 
Massachusetts Congress as a major general "for the defence of this 
and the other Colonies. 111 That Ward should have obtained this position 
l 
was not surprising, for his family was prominent in Massachusetts, and 
Artemas Ward had played an important role in both civil and military 
affairs of the province for many years. His great-grandfather was a 
prominent member of the group that settled both Sudbury and Marl-
1Andrew H. Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, 
from it$ settlement in 1717 tol8~(Bosto~ 1847), p. 496. Dumas' 





borough. And more recently his father, Nahum Ward; had participated 
in the establishment of Shrewsbury. As an original settler in Shrews-
bury Nahum received an initial grant of 58-1/2 acres which he constant-
3 ly worked to enltr~e. He served as Shrewsbury 1 s first moderator and 
selectman, attained the rank of colonel in the militia, was the first 
representative of the town to the General Court, and one of the 
founders of the church in Shrewsbury. 
Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, .the birthplace and life-long residence 
of General Ward, lay east of and adjacent to Worcester. It was a 
relatively new town, founded in the second decade of the eighteenth 
century when a group of thirty men led by John Brigham petitioned the 
General Court of Massachusetts for a charter. The settlement of 
Shrewsbury generally followed the pattern used in the establishment of 
2 
Sumner c. Powell, Puritan Villageg The Formation of a New 
England Town (Middletow:r:1, 1963·), pp. 84, 9tf,"'""108, 110-llT," 12~134 
and 170. Ward, Hi story of the Town of Shrewsbury, p. 457. William 
Ward, the great grandfather of Artema~Ward, was one of the founders 
of Sudbury in 1639. He was tenth in the economic hierarchy of the 
town which was set by the General Court and regarded as final. It is 
not known how much land William Ward possessed in England, but he re-
ceived 45 acres in Sudbury and 130 acr·es i.n West Sudbury in 1658. He 
served a total of twenty-one years in public office. He was also a 
founder of Marlborough and though the amount of his land in that town 
is also unknown it is known that he was one of the largest land owners. 
Little is known about Artemas 1 s grandfather, also named William, 
except that he was born in Marlborough and died there in 1697. 
3 . . : . . 
Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, pp. 12-15. 
On October 23, 1717 the Laying Out Committee of the General Court 
authorized a grant for the town initially divided into forty-two lots 
with an average size of approximately 65 acres" The l&rgest lot was 
70 acres and the smallest 51-1/2 acres~ House Lot Number Eight was 
granted to Nehum Ward on December 30, 1718. 
' 4 
earlier towns such as Sudbury, Marlborough, or Dee;i-hcilm• It was there, 
in Shrewsbury, that Artemas Ward was born on November 27, 1727, the 
fifth of six children of Nahum and Martha Wardo 5 
Nahum Ward became one of the wealthie~t and politically most 
6 
influentia'l men in Worcester Co~nty. (See Table I) Thus Artemas 
spent his childhood among the comfortable surroundings of a prosperous 
New England farm. Little beyond conjecture may be said about Ward's 
early childhood, but several things suggest that he was a serious boy 
7 
by both inclination and training. His parents were faithful members of 
the church in Shrewsbury, and his education was supplemented by Job 
Cushing, the town's minister. 7 
4 
Ward, History of the Town of Shrewsbury, p. 10. The conditions 
set for the settlement of Shrewsbury were much like those for Sudbury, 
Marlborough, or Dedham. The establishment of civil government in 
Shrewsbury was left to selectmen chosen by the people, while new citi-
zens were subject to the approval of the Laying Out Committee. The 
Shrewsbury grant stipulated that every person who received a lot was to 
pay t3,12,0 before June 1, 1725 and that every person distinguished as 
a farmer "settle at least one family upon each of their farms respec-
tively, lying within said town, distinct from the settlement on the new 
lot granted them, or else shall' forfeit to the Country the lots granted 
them." From this it appears that Nahum Ward was already farming land 
in the vicinity of Shrewsbury before the town was founded. However, how 
much land he had cannot be determined. 
5 
Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p. 3. 
6Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America 
(Princeton, 1965), pp. 22-2~ Main indicated that a small group of 
large property owners dominated society in Worcester County. This elite 
constitu'ted about ten per cent of the population who possessed estates 
worth over tlOOO. 
7ward, History~ the Town of Shrewsbu_EZ, pp. 458-459. Nahum Ward 
was a :founder of the church in Shrewsbury to which his wife was added 
in 1727. Papers, R 1, V 1, fs. 12, 42. At a town meeting in June 1729 
fifteen pounds were set aside for building a school house. This money 
was set at a rate and collectedo In November an additional twenty 
pounds was levied to pay a school mastero By April 1732 five pounds 
nineteen shillings were set aside to pay Elias Keys.to "conclude his 
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'>'(This tabulation is not exhaustive 0ecause some receipts are unread-
able and no assurance exists that all receipts survived. 
ap · · h P d rice 1.s tote nearest oun. 
bThis represents the initial tract. of land owned by Ward when he came 
to Shrewsbury. 
cSold by William Ward to Nahum.Ward, purchase price unknown. 
dThis represents Common Lands granted from time to time by the Pro-
prietors of, Shrew13bury. On December 14, 1730 Nahum Ward paid the 
Proprietors twenty-one Pounds for the lands granted to him. 
ePrior to this increment Nahum Ward purchased the farm of ·Robert 
Allen; however, the acreage is unknown. 
fThis is an estill\ation based on the size of•· the original Lot #2, 
Shrewsbury, which was 70 acres. 
gThe acres purchased here unknown. 
hThis acreage included a house and barn. 
iln this purchase thirty-eight Pounds was spent for a purchase of un-
known size. 
jPrice of this acreage unknown. 
8 
Daily Bible reading and prayer were almost certainly an integral 
part of the daily routine of the Ward family, for "domestic instruc-
tion and worship was considered indispensable to the success of the 
weekly services in church, for religion was too important ••• to be left 
8 
to weekly lessons." While at college Ward was among the president's 
volunteers to discourage cursing, an offense he later never failed to 
punish as justice of the peace, and his name never appeared on the 
school's disciplinary list. Moreover, his religious exercise book and 
the numerous biblical references throughout his correspondence imply 
an early acquaintance with the scriptures. 
At sixteen he entered the .freshman class at Harvard, where he was 
placed seventh in rank of his class, another indication of the promi-
nence of his family in the economic and social hierarchy of the pro-
vince. At a time when ;i.t was not unusual for young men to grow weary 
of study and long s.eparations from home, Artemas remained dedicated 
to his studies. He continued at Harvard until he took both the A.B. 
and M.A. degrees and left with a distinguished academic record.. After 
graduation he was a_ schoolmaster at Groton, where he met and married 
Sarah Trowbridge.. Preceding their marriage he returned to Shrewsbury 
and opened a general store in the back of a house his father had pur-
chased in 1750. His business flourished because he handled a wide 
9 variety of merchandise and sold on terms of cash or barter. 
The followi,ng year Ward received his first civic appointment as 
tax assessor. Additional appointments as justice of the peace, town 
8 Edmund S. Morgan. The Puritan Family: Religion and Domestic 
Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England (New York, 1944), P• 139. 
9 
Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, pp. 7-11. 
9 
10 
clerk, and selectman followed in quick succession. The business of 
managing and operating his store, his many civic duties, and the 
development of his Shrewsbury farm made Artemas Ward an exceedingly 
busy man. The d_eath of his father in 17 54 brought an additional 
thirty~two acres to his estate which he continually developed through-
out his life. 10 . Before he reached the age of thirty Artemas Ward had 
become one of the most respected men in Shrewsbury. 
Nor were his abilities unrecognized by provincial authorities, for 
less than a .year after the deat.h of his father Artemas Ward was com-
missioned major of the Third Regiment of Militia in Middlesex and 
Worcester and captain of a comp.any in his home town. Five months 
before his thirtieth birthday he was elected to his first term as 
representative to the General Court from Shrewsbury. During his first 
term as representative his as·signments were confined to committees to 
consider petitions of soldiers who were fighting in the French and 
Indian War, but this was helpful experience for one destined to play 
many important military roles. 
As the conflict of the Seven Years War grew in intensity Ward be-
came a recruiter of troops to be raised for Colonel William Williams's 
regiment which was scheduled to join General Abercrombie's forces at 
Fort Edwards for an attack on Ticonderoga. Ward was not only an 
active recruiter but a willing soldier, and he joined Colonel 
Williams's regiment as a major. It was in Abercrombie's assault against 
10will of Nahum Ward, Papers, Rl, Vl, fs. 211-212. Artemas Ward 
received a small share of his father's estate compared to his brothers 
and sisters. This was probably because Nahum Ward had given Artemas 
a house and lot in 1753 and because Artemas had become a man of consid-
erable means before the death of his father. 
Ticonderoga that Ward distinguished himself as a brave resourceful, 
and competent commander. On July 5, 1758, after weeks of difficult, 
sometimes forced marching, Colonel Williams's Regiment converged with 
General Howe's forces ready to engage the enemy. Three days later, 
after frantic work on breastworks just three quarters of a mile from 
the French encampment, the battle began. Fighting from early in the 
morning and into the night, 2,000 British regulars fell, and Aber-
11 crombie ordered a retreato Ward's diary entry for that day states 
that after an attempt to build a forward breastwork we "shamefully 
12 
retreated." 
The Ticonderoga campaign was full of deprivation, disease, and 
11 
scalping (Ward recorded in his diary for August 9 that two men were 
brought in scalped but alive). 13 His outstanding military performance 
during the campaign brought him a promotion from major to lieutenant 
colonel and prepared him for an important military position in the 
American Revolution. 
Ward returned a hero and wa~ shortly promoted to full colonel. 
He returned quietly to his legislative duties and the work of his farm, 
little disturbed about the revenue acts passed by Parliament after the 
14 end of the war. Indeed Ward, who became Samuel Adams' s warmest 
rural supporter, was little bothered by the Sugar Act. Not until the 
11Percy H. Epler, Masterminds'at the Commonwealth's Heart (Wor-
cester, 1909), PP•, 12-14. Ward, History of .the Town of 
Shrewsbury, PP• 490-4910 Martyn, Life of""""irterras Ward, pp. 
13-15. 
12 
Ward's Ticonderoga Diary, Papers, Rl, V2, f. 6. 
13rbid., f. 7. 
14John Co Miller, Sam Adams 
p. 46. Martyn, _L_i_f_e_o_f Artemas 
Pioneer in Propaganda (Boston, 1936), 
Ward, p. 33, 
12 
following year with the passage of the Stamp Act, did Ward become 
Adams's spokesman in rural areas of Massachusetts, where his voice 
carried more weight than Adams's. He became so obnoxious to Governor 
Francis Bernard that the Governor finally revoked his commission in 
the militia and twice vetoed his election to the General Court. 
Tradition has it that .when the courier delivered the Governor's letter 
that Colonel Ward retorted: 
Give my coin9liments to the Governor and say to him that I 
consider myself twice hbriored, but· more·in being super-
seded than in being comm~ss'ioned, and that I thank him 
for this, since the motive.that dictated it is evidence 
that I am what he is not, a friend to my country.15 
Never ve.rbose, Ward was not a pamphleteer but gave Adams his full 
support in the General Assembly and was among the ninety-two who re-
fused to vote to rescind Adams' Circular Letter in 1768. Ward was 
an important figure in shaping opinion in rural Massachusetts. He was 
so effective that.Shrewsbury was one of the few towns to accept the 
Boston Circular verbatim. 16 
British officials attempted t_o enforce royal policies while men 
like Samuel Adams and J~hn Hancock took advantage of every real and 
imagined grievance to inc:rease the resistance. The lid blew when 
British regu,la:rs were sent to Concord on April 19, 1775 to destroy a 
munitions store and to arrest Adams and Hancock. The overwhelming 
resistance at Concord made the British beat a rapid retreat_to Boston. 
If the British were hurried the Americans were frantic. War had come 
! 
15Epler, Masterminds at the Cdmm.cinweaith' s Heart, ·P-· 12 •. Ward, " 
History ·of the, Town of Shrewsbury, P• 493. 
16Richard D. Brown, "Massachusetts Towns Reply to the Boston Com-
mittee of Correspondence, 1773 ," William and Mary Quarterly, XXV ( 1968), 
PP• 22-39. 
13 
but there was no army. The Massachusetts legislature, meeting extra-
legally as the Second Provincial Congress, appointed Artemas Wa~d as 
commander-in-chief of its forces. The following day Ward was at his 
, 17 
headquarters in Cambridge. 
Until Washington arrived on July 2nd, it was Ward who directed 
the organization, build-up, and movement of American forces against the 
British. The great mass of raw recruits that hurried to Boston after 
events at Lexington must have shockedGeneral Ward. No stranger to 
military matters, General Ward accepted this gigantic task with some 
18 reluctance. Organization of the Cambridge forces would have been a 
formidable task under the most;favorable conditions, but Ward's unhappy 
position was to effect organization under duress of desertion, disease, 
d 1 k f d . . 1· 19 an utter ac o iscip ine. 
Much of the political A,rtemas Ward was evident as he tried to give 
order and direction to the forces at Cambridge. Like Samuel Adams, the 
Revolution and republicanism meant more to Ward than simply the "elimi-
nation of a king." It involved a "moral dimension, a utopian depth," 
that "involved the very character of their society. 1120 To Ward, no 
less than to Adams, the Revolution was to create a "Christian 
17 . 
General Ward's Order Book, Pap~rs, R. 4, P II, f. 1. General 
Ward arrived at Cambridge on April 20 and called the first council of 
war. Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence Military Atti-
tudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 (New York, 1971), P• 47. 
18Bruce Lancaster, From Lexington to Liberty (New York, 1955), 
P• 119. 
19 General Ward's Order Book, Papers, R. 4, P. II, f. 60-75. Ward's 
Order Book ·indicates that his major problems at 'Cambridge were small-
pox and lack of discipline. 
20wood, ·· The Crea.tion _of .the American R.epublic 1776-1783 (Chapel 
llill;. 1969);p.:·51 •. , - -
14 
21 
Sparta." Thi;,,view of the Revolution and the society to be created 
by it greatly affected Ward's political thought. In some degree it 
accounted for the harshness of his orders at Cambridge, partly it 
disclosed his parochialism and it neatly fitted his conception of the 
perfect puritan republic. In great measure it explained his preoccu-
pation with things "New England," for they ~ere Spartan attributes. 
22 Corrupt morals; money-getting and public licentiousness had no place. 
Many of Ward's daily orders at Cambridge were the result 9f the 
unusual exigencies of the situation. Many were, however, anomalous and 
clearly elucidated the effect his religion and morals had on his 
thought. In fact, Ward's initial pr.dilection for leniency may have 
been due more to the nature of his authority than his personal inclina-
tion, for he was given appreciably less power than Washington was later 
given. The Massachusetts committee of safety, responsible to the Pro-
vincial Congress, sat continuously at Cambridge. And it was not un-
k f h C . k h" d 23 nown or t e ongress t.o revo e is or ers. Little by little a 
system of organization was impl~men:ted so that just twenty-three days 
after his arrival it.was' possible for General Ward to obtain complete 
21Ibid., P• 421. 
22 Undated, unsigned letter by Ward, Papers, R 4, P III, f. 329; 
Ward to Thomas Walter Ward, April· JO;,· 1781, R J, .V 5, fs. 53, 54; 
unfinished draft lette.r December 14, 1780, __ R 4, P III, fs .• 3"27, 328. 
23Higginbotha_m;: .the War .of_ Amf!r~can Independence,--p •. 65,. John. 
Avery to Artemas Ward, July 4, I776, Papers, Reel 4, Part II, 305; 
"The Board was this day informed that you had given Liberty to a number 
of Continental Troops now stationed at Winter Hill to receive the small 
pox by inoculation--The Board are unwi.;Llin5 to credit such a report--
as there is an act of this colony prohibiting inoculation except in the 
town of Boston--they therefore request if you have given out any such 
orders that you would immedioately recall them." 
15 
and detailed personnel rosters from his regimental commanders. 24 
Simultaneously Ward directed his attention to desertion. Men who 
initially responded with enthusiasm quickly became disgruntled with the 
drab fare of military life. This problem reached such magnitude that 
h d ' d 1 ' h' h ' 11 . 1 · · d 25 e evise a pan in w ic passes were virtua ye iminate. 
The chaotic conditions that existed during the first days after 
General Ward's arrival at Cambridge created a serious danger to the 
health of the troops. The frequent use of fatigue details greatly 
improved conditions but were too late to prevent the outbreak of small 
pox. This was a problem that threatened not only the immediate well-
being of thousands of soldiers but one that could undermine the entire 
war effort. Confronted by such an appalling threat, Ward quickly iso-
lated the infected group and moved to secure means of inoculation 
should it become necessary. To further insure that the camp remain 
clean he ordered rigid daily inspections and provided stiff penalties 
for those officers inclined toward leniency in inspections. 26 
Yet many of his orders were-perhaps too severe, some were without 
precedent, and others stemmed more from his personal moral code than 
from the exigencies of the war. On June 3 Ward ordered that each regi-
mental commander insure that his men attend their prayers morning and 
night and attend church services on Sunday. Later that same month, he 
24 
General Order of June 3, 1775, Papers, R 4, P II, f. 71. 
25 General Order of May 3, 1775, ibid., f. 67; "That no field offi-
cer presume to give a pass to any person to go out of camp before 
that person shall have presented to that field officer a person not 
belonging to the camp and out of the same town, to which the person 
who makes the application belongs, who is to tarry in camp, till the 
person that has leave returns." 
26 General Order of May 31, 1775, Papers, R 4, P II, fo 70. 
16 
announced that no swearing, or cursing, nor any indecent language or 
behavior, would be tolerated. He further admonished all persons to help 
27 keep lewd women from the camp.. These orders were not absolutely es-
sential to the successful prosecut~on of the war, but Ward felt that 
they were. A "general corruption of morals" would bring certain 
"destruction," that "a.s long as the ·~eople ••• are in pursuit of vanity, 
we have no reason to expect anything" but that "the hand of the Lord 
'11 b . . h d . 1128 w1 e stretc e out against us. 
Nevertheless, the work ac,hieved by General Ward before the arrival 
of Washington in organization of the army was vital to any effective 
combat effort. The effectiveness of his work at Cambridge was reflected 
at Bunker's Hill on June 17, 1775. At eleven in the morning in answer 
to Colonel Pre~cott's request Ward had sent Colonels Stark's and Reed's 
regiments as reinforcements and at one o'clock ordered the remainder 
of his forces to Bunker's Hill. The battle began at three o'clock and 
was finished before five but was savagely fought and constituted a 
moral victory for American forc~s. Ward had done so much with what he 
had that on June 20 Connecticut was encouraged to place its forces 
under his command and urged the other colonies to do likewise. However, 
·on June 15, 177 5 the Continental Congr~ss' appointed .George Washington 
commander-in-chief of continental forces, and on July 22 Ward was ap-
pointed first major general and second in command. Washington arrived 
to take charge of the nearly 17,000 troops assembled at Cambridge on 
. . l . 
July 3. An army chaplain present in the camp when Washington arrived 
27 General Orders of June 3 and June 30, 1775, ibid.; fs. 70, 71, 74. 
28 Undated, unsigned letter, ibid., P III, f. 329. 
cormnented: 
There is great overturning in the camp, as to order and 
regularity. New lords, new laws. The Generals Washington 
and Lee are upon the lines every day. New orders from 
his Excellency are read to the respective regiments every 
morning after prayers.29 
The worsening condition of General Ward's gallstones had pro-
hibited his daily trooping the line, but he had shown the same energy 
in the organization of the forces that Washington was displaying in 
their reorganization. Indeed the careers of the two Generals up to 
their arrival in Cambridge were remarkably similar. Neither were 
brilliant but both possessed,solid powers of reason, both were rather 
reserved but apt to win and hold respect, each ardently devoted to 
duty yet resentful of criticism.. Both served as moderates in their 
" 
respective provincial legislatures, both gained their first military 
commissions iargely as a result of political connections, both served 
with distinction in the French ~nd Indian war--Washingtonunder Brad-
17 
dock and Ward under Abercrombie--and finally, both had faced the lonely 
bl f . d ' h' f 30 pro ems o a cormnan er-1.n-c 1.e. It is ironic that two men with so 
much in common and so alike in temperament should have allowed their 
29Jared Sparks, ed., The Writings of George Washington Being His 
Correspondence, Addresses, Messages~ Other Papers Official and 
Private (Boston, 1839) III, 491. 
30John c. Miller, Triumph of Freedom 1775-1783 (Boston, 1948), P• 
63. Washington's cormnission in 1754 came largely as a result of having 
"the backing of the right people." 
18 
personal esteem for each other to deteriorate. And yet, they did. 31 
After the arrival of Washington, Ward took charge of the right 
wing at Dorchester Heights. It was in driving the British from Boston 
that Ward's generalship was ~st apparent, for it was his forces and 
his battle plan that forced t.he regulars from that city in March 1776. 
It was at this poin~ that the relations between Ward and Washington 
began to worsen. Late in April Washington expressed concern that "I 
learn from every hand, that your works for the defense of Boston go 
exceeding slow," and ordered that "no time ••• be lost in putting the 
32 town in the best posture of defense." Ward replied that he had 
"given all attention in my power to the works," reported the progress 
that was being made, and ended his report by stating that he had only 
- 33 half as many teams as the work required. Even prior to this letter 
Ward had asked to be relieved because gallstones made it impossible for 
31 -
John R. Alden, _The American Revolution 1775-1783 (New York, 1954), 
P• 32. Epler, Master~ds ·at ·the ·,qommoiiweait.h, 1 s J(eart, '.P..• 46:, ·. 
Christopher Gore to Thomas Walte;Wa:rd, January 22";-1819, Papers, R 3. 
V 6, fs. 304-305. The.jealousy ot General Charles Lee supposedly was 
the main contributing factor to-the break between Washington and Ward. 
Lee described Ward as "more fit to be a churchwarden than a general" 
and termed him a "chimney-side hero." Christopher Gore stated that 
General Ward always attended ];>-resident Washington's Levees but never 
accepted his dinner invitations. Goreattributed the dispute to a 
letter written by Washington in the "early part. of the Revolutionary 
War" which contained remarks 11 it1jurio·us to the reputation· of General 
Ward.". After Washi.ngton. retired from public life he wrote Ward ex-
pressing "the highest regard for the character of General Ward in all 
the departments 6f public duty in which he had acted." However, Ward 
seems to have never gotten ov.er what _he felt was a betrayal. As late 
as 1792 Ward claimed that his illness should excuse him from participa-
tion in the President's birthday celebration. 
32George Washington to Artemas Ward, April 29, 1776, Papers, R 4, 
P III, f. 295. 
33ward to Washington, undated, ibid., f. 296. 
him to execute his duties to his own satisfaction. At the specific 
request of Washington he retained his command until November, when he 
was f ' 11 l' d 34 1.na ·Y re 1.eve • 
Ward's experience from boyhood through 1777 formed the major 
19 
lines of his political thought. His long experience in parochial poli-
tics and the ethnocentric attitude he developed for Massachusetts 
society colored his political thought for the rest of his life. His 
national political career which began in November 1779 with his 
appointment to the Continental Congre·ss· further illuminated the effect 
parochial politics had on the direction of the new republic. 
34Joseph Priestly to Artemas Ward, April 24, 1776, Edmund c. 
Burnett, ed., Letters of the Members of~ Continental Congress, I, 
(Washington, 1931), p.""'430:-
CHAPTER Ill 
THE CONFEDERATION PERIOD 
The distaste Artemas Ward developed for life as a congressional 
delegate was understandable. He did not enjoy Life in Philadelphia; the 
business of Congress, he felt, .proceeded too slowly, and finally, he 
was among a group of early patriots who believed that the Revolution 
1 
was being undermined by nationalists in .Congress. Elected by the 
Massachusetts General Court on November LB, 1779, he began his congres-
sional career in one of the most critical periods of the war. The con-
tinental army was on the verge of collapse for want of adequate supplies, 
General Washington needed additional enlistments, the inflated economy 
seemed ready to burst, and even to supply the immediate needs of the 
2 government was a perplexing problem. Many in Congress stood ready 
to subordinate congressional authority to France to relieve the economy 
1 
Ward to Thomas Walter Ward, March 1, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 
307. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 
(Chapel Hill-;-r969), p. 420:~-nBy the late seventies the old patriots, 
embodied in the Adams-Lee junto saw a 'Design' afoot 'a joynt combination 
of political and commercial men' centering in New York and the South, 
which aimed to exclude from power all 'those who took an active part and 
continued consistent in support of the Liberties of America' in order 
to 'get the trade;the wealth, the power and the Government of America 
into their own hands.'" 
2 
Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, P• 253. Edmund C. Burnett, The 
Continental Congress: !_ definitive history of the Continental Congress 




and to supply the army. However, others like Ward and Samuel Adams, 
were whole-heartedly against any such scheme as this, and viewed it as 
an alarming betrayal of the Revolution. 4 Yet no one denied the dire 
state of affairs. 
On December lJ 1780 Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering ob-
served to his assistant Charles Pettit that all moneys raised by the 
states were exhausted to obtain ''very partial supplies," and that the 
continental treasury "has remained empty. 11 The army was unpaid for 
the year, "p'romises of continental officers were "held in no esteem," 
states would not furnish supplies, and finally Pickering raised the 
question, "ls it imagined that the war .can be continued with such in-
sufficient means. 115 
part: 
For this sad condition of affairs Pickering blamed Congress in 
I can neither act nor cease to act without wounding my feel-
ings and subjecting myself to the charge of neglect of duty 
or of arbitrary, unr~as<:1nable, or illegal conduct. And am I 
indeed never to expect relief? ls it unlawful for .Congress 
3Gaillard Hunt, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-
1789, (Washington, 1912), XX, 614. Hereinafter cited as Journals of 
the Continental ,Congress. Congress was considering whether to in-
struct the United States Minister to France to undertake no peace ne-
gotiations without the concurrence of the French. 
4 . Samuel Adams to James Warren, February 1, 1781, Harry A. Cushing, 
ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams, (New York, 1968), IV, 242-244: 11 1 
have been assured that the court of F.rance would be highly disgusted 
with any of its ministers if they s·hould improperly interfere in our 
Councils; and indeed when I consider the jealousy of a Rising Repub-
lick, I think nothing would equal the impolicy of their attempting it, 
but the imprudence of Congress in submitting to it." 
5Timothy Pickering to Charles Pettit, December 1, 1780, "Letters 
from the Board of War and Ordnance 1780-1781," Micro-film edition of 
"Papers of the Continental Congresses 1774-1789,'' I.tern #L48, Roll 161, 
(Washington D.C.: 1958), frames 258-260. Hereinafter cited as Letters 
from the Board of War. 
to point out to the several states the very steps they must 
take to furnish supplies? Congress have directed me to 
apply to states for forage but what will it avail? I have 
already complied in part and shall now fully comply with the 
direction but only to obey the order of Congress and not in 
expectation of its producing any good effect.6 
The frustration Pickering fel~_was not without justificationo In 
September 1781 the Board of War, in response to ·a congressional order 
for the securing of public stores in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, re-
22 
ported only that, "we have it not in our power to move our own paper," 
and that "when furnished with means," they would be "very ready to obey 
7 
the directions of Congress." In June 1780 the Board of the Treasury 
"knew not which way to turn themselves to afford any relief to the 
8 
daily pressing demands made on them from many quarters." 
The multiple difficulties of Congress did not relieve it from 
responsibility for defense of the southern states, and for building 
an army for the southo General Horatio Gates was sent to take command 
of the southern army, and Congress resolved that for his immediate 
needs he should be authorized to call on the states of Virginia, North 
and South Carolina and Georgia for supplies. 9 Shortly thereafter, 
Congress recommended t·hat North Carolina order 4,000 militia to join 
the army, that Gates be allowed to keep his troop strength at a minimum 
of 10 ,000, and that Virginia and North Carolina keep 3 ,000 troops on 
6Timothy Pickering to Charles Pettit, December 1, 1780, Letters 
from the Board of War, fso 258-260. 
7 
Board of War to President of Congress, September 20, 1781, 
ibid., fo 2550 
8 
Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 564. 
9 
Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, po 2550 Journals of the Continen-
tal Congress, XVII, 5090 
23 
alert "for the shortest possible noticeo"lO 
At the same time Congress was faced with building an army, it was 
at a loss as to how to get another army in the position to move. The 
Board of the Treasury informed Congress on June 26 that it was "utterly 
out of the power" of the Board to make any provision for .. Washington' s 
army, "the treasury of the United States at this. time being totally 
11 
exhausted .. " 
The agency of Congress most responsible for prosecution of the 
war was the Board of Waro The task of sµpplying the army with adequate 
provisions was assigned to the Board, and many times this involved 
finding a means of paying for the supplieso Added to this primary 
function were other major assignments such as paying the army, hearing. 
and judging the merits of sund/y. kinds of soldiers' petitions, and to 
some extent even campaign planning. 
On June 24, 1780 Ward replaced John Mathews of South Carolina as 
a member of the Board of Waro Ward was particularly suited to the 
assignmento He knew from first hand experience that inadequate pro-
vision could cripple the effectiveness of combat operations, and judging 
the merits of soldiers' petitions had been his primary task as a member 
· . 12 
of the General Court of Massach~setts. 
Two days later Ward was assigned to a committee of five to collect 
taxes from the states, which were $45,523,460072 in arrearso 13 The 
10 Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 533a 
11Ibido, 563a 
12ward to Washington, undated letter, Papers, R 4, P III, f. 2960 
13 
Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 555, 5640 
24 
report of this committee was delivered in Congress two days later, and 
Congress ordered that warrants be drawn in favor of the United States 
from New Hampshire to Maryland for their proportions of the "ten mil-
14 
lions specially called for by the resolution of May 19 last." The 
expresses sent with these warrants conveyed great urgency since the 
15 funds were "essential to the very existence of the army." This was 
about all that Congress could do, but it was hardly enough to meet the 
immediate needs of the war. Two quartermasters be.lieved that the 
states could. easily supply the needs of the army if they·wouldo Na-
thanael Greene contended that the states were more able to furnish 
16 
supplies than they had been for three years. Timothy Pickering 
pointed out tha.t "the states will not themselves furnish necessaries 
for the army and hold up the terror of their laws to every continental 
agent who dares to attempt to procure them .. " However, he felt that the 
states could, "I say the states will not; for they certainly can if 
they will procure supplies. 1117 The general feeling among many members 
of Congress was that private gain motivated more people than did con-
18 
cern for the public goodo 
14 · 
Ibid., 437, 438, 5750 On May 19, 1780 Congress resolved that 
the states of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire pay $10 
million for the express purpose of bringing an army into the field. 
15Ibid., 576. 
16 
Burnett, The Continental Congress, po 403. 
17T· h p· k . B d f W D b 9 1780 L f imot y ic ering to oar o ar, ecem er , , etters rom 
the Board of War, f. 2490 
18 
Burnett, The Continental Congress, po 403. Samuel Adams to 
Benjamin Austin, March 9, ·· 1779, Cushing ed .. , The Writings of Samuel 
Adams, IV, 132-137. 
25 
To Ward, those who sought private gain did so at the public ex-
pense, betrayed republican principles, and represented a real threat to 
the perfect republico The foundation of a republic was virtue, with 
laws that would serve as the "authoritative gua"rdians of virtue. 1119 
Ward's republican ideology, like Adams's, had no room for those he 
believed to be aristocratic, pretentious, or dishonest. 20 Ideally, 
"religion and republicanism would work hand in hand to create frugality, 
21 honesty, self-denial, and benevolence among the people. The Revolu-
. 1 11 1 · . 1 22 d W d · 11 · d tion was mora as we as po itica, an ar continua y reiterate 
the idea that private virtue was necessary for public success. 23 
Because of the depreciation of the currency, because taxes were 
neither uniformly or punctually paid, and because contracts often al-
lowed exorbitant profits, the Congress devised a plan for requisition-
ing supplies from the stateso This scheme was practical and feasible. 
Though great bickering broke out among the delegations with regard to 
the proper amount furnished by each state, it was generally recognized 
that certain inequities would necessarily occur. The delegations from 
19 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, P• 120. 
20undated, unsigned draft letter, December 14, 1780; Papers, R 4, 
PIII, fs. 327-328. In this letter Ward made' obvious referen'ce to John 
Hancock, who was entered in the gubernatorial contest of 1780. To Ward 
the term "aristocrlitic" fitted suc.h prominent commercial men as John 
Hancock and Robert Morris, who did not hesitate to mix public with 
private business, loved luxury, and whom he suspected -0f realizing a 
personal profit at public expense. However, much depended on who was 
speaking. Two of Ward's closest political associates, Samuel Adams 
and Benjamin Lincoln, were accused respectively of being an "embezzler 
and autocrat" and an "aristocrat and leader of monarchy." Van Beck 
'Hall, Politics without Parties Massachusetts, 1780-1791 (Pittsburgh, 
1972), P• 84. 
21wood, The Creation of the American Republic, PP• 118, 220. 
22Ibid., PP• 117-118. 
23ward to Thomas W. Ward, April 6, 1781, R 3, V 5, fso 53, 540 
26 
North and South Carolina felt that their quotas were far beyond their 
states' proportion but also recognized that unless the states cooper-
24 ated to the fullest extent the war might be lost. Others were not so 
ready to cooperate. Benjamin Lincoln wrote Ward that, "a zeal for the 
conunon cause and an unalterable determination to support it, at every 
hazard and expense," have led Massachusetts into many advances to the 
United States ''over and above what has been advanced by other states)lS 
He suggested that when the "war have ceased and the particular dis-
f II • ld b h d h f • d 26 tresses orgotten, it wou et e ,gree y w o pro ite mosto ,. Final-
ly, he felt that the state should "not make advances--but on the most 
27 
explicit regulations of Congress." The design was agreed to on 
December 14, 1779. 28 
The system was practical but the results were dubious., The states 
were as reluctant to fill their quotas as they were to pay taxes. A 
letter to the War Office from a field conunander reflected the situation: 
••• we are clearly convinced that unless this [Pennsylvania] 
and the state of Jersey fully supply their quota of flour 
much distress will ensue and if no more supplies of this 
article are sent for the ensuing campaign than those which 
appear to have been furnished for the last the army cannot 
possibly be kept together.29 
24 
Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 404. 





Burnett, The Continental Congress, po 402. 
29 
Board of War to President of Congress, March 31, 1781, Letters 
from the Board of War, f. 339. 
27 
The Board of War was constantly flooded with pleas for money and 
provisions. The shortage of both was always extremee In March 1781 a 
group of officers from a Pennsy~vania detachment informed the Board of 
War that they would not march without at least partial pay. The situ-
ation was aggravated when it'was discovered that the state had no money 
to pay the.m. The Board reported that 11 $116, 328 in the old emission or 
30 $28, 781 in the new" would enable the .detachment to ma't'ch.. Almost 
simultaneously the commander at Fort Pitt reported that, unless rein-
forced with provisions, he woulc;l be t.Jnable to pursue the enemy and be 
· 31 
forced to abandon "posts of the.first consequence .. " Against the out-
cry for specific requisitions from the states Ward retorted, "I am no 
more fond of calling on the stat.es for specific supplies than you 
are," since the r.esolution "took place from necessity and not from 
choice. 1132 He added that although this method was twice as costly 
it would be practiced until money was furnished. 33 
The efforts of Congress and the Board of War were not without re-
sults. On April 6, 1781 Ward wrote his son concerning progress in the 
war. Generals Sumpter and Pig~o;n had taken 300 prisoners at a point in 
Carolina called hinety-sixlocated sixty miles from Camden about 120 
miles northwest of Charleston. Nevertheless, he was somewhat appre-
hensive and believed that the enemy would carry on the war with as 
much vigor as it had ill any summer since.the War had begun, "if we can 
30Board of War to President of Congress, March 1781, Letters from 
the Board of War, fo 3490 
31naniel Brodhrad to Richard Peters, June 22, 1781, ibid$, fo 301. 
32unsigned letter, February 8, 1781, Papers, R 3, VS, fse 39-400 
33Ibid. 
28 
3'4 judge from present appearances.". His attitude toward the war was one 
of cautious optimism. He hoped that, "the good Lord will prepare this 
people for what is before them," and felt that if "there was a more 
general execution to the southward of the Delaware River," and a "more 
true fear of God," that "we should have more reason to expect the bles-
sing of heaven." However, he did not despair of deliverance," but 
felt that "we ma.y probably be made to suffer many grievances, hard-
35 ships and trials to prepare us for such a matter as peaceo 11 
Ward's attitude toward the war wa:s a g9od example of how his 
religious beliefs affected his political thoughto God's blessing was 
essential to both the successful prosecution of the war and the con-
clusion of a desirable peaceo ·~e compared the Revolution to the 
wanderings of the Israelites under Moses and believed that only an 
acknowledgement of God would, in the final analysis, bring a success-
ful conclusion to the confli~t .. 36 Almost the entire war had gone to the 
south in 1780-1781, and it was not going well .. Samuel Adams admonished 
his friend Richard Henry Lee to. "make every possible effort" to defeat 
the British, who had arrived in Virginia and were burning "all before 
37 
them." 
Ward believed 0 that the war went badly in the south because of the 
character of the southern populationo He repeatedly cautioned his son 
34 Ward to Thomas Wo Ward, April 6, 1781, ibid., R 3, V 5, fso 53-54e 
35Ibid. 
36 Ward to Thomas Wo Ward, April 6, 1781, Papers, R :3, V 5, Fso53-54. 
37samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, October 31, 1780 and Adams 
to Samuel Cooper, November 7, 1780. Cushing, The Writings of Samuel 
Adams, IV, 215-216, 217-2180 
29 
Henry Dana Ward not to imbibe the traits of South Carolinians. 38 It 
was typical of him to view the efforts of Massachusetts as paramount 
and the exertions of the southern states as meagre by comparison. On 
August 23, 1780 his second cousin and oue-time aide-de-camp Joseph Ward 
wrote: 
I am sorry to learn the southern states have not exerted 
themselves in ·raising their quota of men for the campaign 
agreeable to the requisition 6£ Congress •••• !£ all the 
states tax as severely 1;1.s this [Massachusetts] has done, 
the money must rise soon; but should they be as dilatory 
as they have been in other matters, the con.sequence might 
be fatal to our fin'ances.39 
This was illustrative of General W'ard' s. own views.. The South was 
despicable because somehow they could rtever make a contribution equal 
to that of Massachusetts. They were not, in a word, filled with the 
spirit of New En'gland politics. or religion, and that was their undoing. 
The failure of the states to carry out their responsibilities 
perhaps accounted for Ward's support of a five per cent tax on imports 
40 to be levied by Congress. Indeed, this was one of the few issues 
on which Ward disagreed with the New England bloc in Congress. Always 
apprehensive of an over-concentration of power, he was only too aware 
of the great need for a dependable and regular source of revenue. How-
ever, he was not ready to go the whole len~th by granting Congress the 
power to regulate interstate commerce or by investing extensive powers 
in a superintendent of finance. On the latter issue Ward proved par-
ticularly stubborn. On the motion that-Congress not require 
38ward's son practiced law in Orange County, South Carolina. 
39 
Joseph Ward to Artemas Ward, August 23, 1780, "Joseph Ward 
Collection,". (Chicfgo: Chicago Historical Society), folder no. 12. 
40Journals of the Continental Congress, XIX, 111. 
Morris to dissolve commercial ties made prior to his acceptance of 
the superintendency Ward was opposed; on the resolution empowering the 
41 superintendent to hire and dismiss assistants, he was also opposed. 
Finally, when Congress voted unanimously for Morris, Ward and his 
colleague, Samuel Adams, abstained from voting. 42 
Though Ward and Adams were the only members of Congress not to 
agree to the appointment of Morris, they were not alone in holding 
reservations about his appointment. In July 1780 Thomas McKean of 
Delaware wrot,e Adams that: 
There are some amongst us, who are so fond of having a great 
and powerful man to look up to, that tho' they may not like 
the name of king, seem anxious to confer kingly powers, under 
the titles of Dictator, Superintendent of Finance, or some 43 
such, but the majority do not yet appear to be so disposed. 
The Whig opposition to Morris's appointment stemmed in large part 
from a general fear of "aspiring men," and a reluctance to see those 
men gain from the public distress. It was upon these principles that 
30 
Ward opposed Morris. Then, too, the schemes of Morris promised a 
closer union of the several states ·in "one general money connection,1144 
which was in direct opposition to Ward's republicanism. The Revolution 
was to effect a confederation of sovereign states, in most respects, and 
not a union governed by a commercial aristocracy. Ward was among those 
New Englanders who by the early 1780's saw themselves "as the last 
41Ibid., 289, 338. 
42Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 21, 1781, Burnett, 
ed., Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress, V, 577-580. 
I 
43Quoted in Burnett, The Continental Congress, P• 514. 
44Merrill Jensen, The New Nation! History of the United States 
During the Confederation 1781-1789 (New York, 1950), P• 62. 
31 
bastion of devout republicanism. 1145 Samuel Adams boasted to his wife 
that 11 1 have not raised a fortune in the service of my country," while 
Ward rejected a third appointment to Congress because ill health and 
family circumstances prevented his full attention to the work of 
46 
Congress. 
The office of superintendent of finance was one that promised to 
concentrate power, and Ward believed the appointment of a corrnnercial 
man such as Morris would assure it. Those who opposed Morris saw in him 
the "spearhead of a movement to overthrow the federal government and to 
establish a dictatorship.1147 Whatever good Morris might do for the 
finances of the country were overshadowed, the opposition felt, because 
it did not stem. from "disinterested patriotism.1148 Ward proved adamant 
in opposition to every measure to increase the powers of the superin-
tendent of finance. He was opposed to a motion of Congress to make 
bills of credit emitted by Congress legal tender and stood ardently 
against Morris's bank. 49 What was needed, according to Ward, was a 
greater coordination of the corrnnon cause--local and private interests 
45wood, .The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, P• 421. 
Corrnnercial men such as ~ohn H?ncock and Robert Morris were suspected 
of making profits from the war while the people suffered deprivation. 
Hence it was easy for Ward to view himself as a champion of the common 
people. 
46samuel Adams to Mrs. Adams, November 24, 1780, Cushing, ed., The 
Writings of Samuel Adams, IV, 225-227. Ward to Samuel Adams, November 
5, 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, f. 74. 
47 
Jensen, The New Nation, p. 57. 
48rbid., E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse~ History of 
American Public Finance, 1776-1790, (Durham, 1961), P• 1390 
49Journals of the Continental Congress, XIX, 332 and XX, 547. 
should submerge themselves by common consent based upon an informed 
50 citizenry and not upon enlarged powers for Congress. 
The "Christian Sparta," to use Samuel Adams's revealing phrase 
which Ward endorsed, and for ·which good Whigs aspired, depended upon 
"the virtue of the people; virtue grows on knowledge, and knowledge 
on education. 1151 In.fact, education was the crucial ingredient for 
32 
the survival of republicanism. Republican governments would, in time, 
"beget republican ·.opinions and manners. 1152 Ward declared, "people many 
times run into excesses for want of consideration, 11 .and that there 
was "no more effectual way to bring them to a sense of their duty" 
than to address them in a "serious and solemn manner." It was important 
that this should be in "due season,".or the people would become "habitu-
53 ated" and "there will be a general corruption of morals." Education 
spawned virtue and virtue was vital for God's support of the Revolution. 
Ward explained that he was aware of the "interposition of Divine Provi-
dence in the detection-of Arnold's traitorous conspiracy," and that he 
wished "we may all be truly .thankful therefore not only in word but in 
~eed," not only for that one intervention but for the "many unobserved 
interpositions of Divine Providence in our behalf.1154 Samuel Adams 
commented to James Warren that a gener~l "Dissolution of Pr;i.nciples & 
Manners will more surely overthrow the Liberties of America than the 
50 Unsigned letter, February 8, 1781,.P~pers, R 3, V 5, fs. 39-40. 
51wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, P• 120. 
52Ibid., P• 426. 
53u . d nsigne, undated letter, Papers, R 4, P III, f. 329. 
54u . d nsigne draft letter, December 14, 1780, ibid., R 4, P III, fs. 
327-328. 
33 
whole Force of the Common Enemy," and impressed upon him the necessity 
55 of supporting the "Education of our country." 
Ideologically the two men were very close, and their votes in the 
Continental Congress were the same on every issue. 56 Samuel Adams 
clearly stood a leader in the New England bloc in Congress. The bloc 
was generally characteri:,?:ed by extreme jealousy of their state powers, 
a suspicion of centralization, and support of a sound fiscal policy 
based upo.n individual state responsibility rather than the coercive 
power of Congress. This bloc stood in contrast to the middle and 
southern states led by more nationalistic men like Robert Morris of 
Pennsylvania, Alexander Hamilton of New York, and John Mathews of South 
Carolina. Ward voted with the New England bloc fully sixty-five per 
f h . 57 cent o t e time. In 1780-1781 Ward believed that the New England 
states, and particularly Massachusetts, were the guardians of the 
Spirit of 1 76, which meant that New Englanders were not only foremost 
in war but, that they would guard against the encroachments of Congress 
on the states. 
The need for a dependable and regular source of revenue drove 
Congress to drastic action. In October 1780 Virginia submitted a 
resolution which provided that lands ceded to the United States should 
55 Samuel Adams .to James Warren, February 12, 1779, Cushing, ed., 
The Writings of Samuel Adams, IV, 123..;;124. 
56clifford L. Lord, ed., The Atlas of Congressional Roll Calls: 
The Continental Congresses and of the.Confederation 1777:J:789, (New York, 
1943), I, C 0629-C 0717. 
57This percentage was determined by adding the actual number of 
times Ward voted in agreement with the majority of New England states 
on all issues. One scholar has found a higher percentage by comparing 
Ward's vote with that of individual New England delegates. 
34 
be disposed of for the common benefit of the several states and formed 
into states under such regulations as were determined by Congress. 
There was the catch, however, that Virginia would agree to land cession 
only if Congress would void all land purchases in the Old Northwest, 
• 58 
and guarantee her the region of Kentucky. Ward, with a deep concern 
f N E . 1 d' . d · h 1 · 59 or ew ng an .s interests, vote against t e reso ution. He may 
also have been motivated by the fact that the bill would have greatly 
increased the power of Congress. Early the next year a motion was 
raised to empower Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Ward 
was absent for· that vote, but his alter-ego, Samuel Adams, voted against 
the measure; and it is more than likely that Ward too would have voted 
against it. Not even the distresses of the war induced him to advocate 
congressional powers that would subtract from the sovereignty of the 
states. In May, 1781, while Congress was desperately searching for 
means to furnish the immediate needs of the army, Ward opposed a 
bill which directed the states to accept bills drawn on them by the 
60 
United States treasurer "as soon as presented." He went even further 
by voting against a measure which would have given Congress regulatory 
f . 61 powers or state currency issues. 
These:votes were illustrative of the ends Ward felt the Revolu-
! 
tion sh0uld achieve. A Christian Sparta w6uld be endangered by a 
Congress powerful enough to regulate the individual states. Ward's 
58 Jensen, The New Nation, PP• 350-351. 
59 Journals of the Continental Congress, XVII, 916. 
60rbid., XX, 524. 
61Ibid., 593. 
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military experience in the early stages of the Revolution had con-
vinced him of the need for collective unity, but never did it alter 
his basic assumptions about republicanism or significantly alter his 
political postureo Unlike some military men such as generals Varnum 
and Sullivan, his military experience did not impel him toward cen-
tralism. 
As a member of the Board of War Ward was most sympathetic to the 
needs of the army, and the Board generally reported in favor of the 
military; however, for the most part the Board was restricted to 
simple recommendations to Congress. In Congress Ward voted about 
11 f d . h · 1 · 62 equa y or an against t e mi itary. 
Ward's career in the Continental Congress was significant, 
for it deepend his commitment to republicanism, refined his political 
thought, and provided valuable experience for his career in the feder-
al Congress. Reappointed to a third term, he declined to serve, 
"considering the circumstances of my family and my own state of 
healtho 1163 
Ward did not find the politi'cal scene in Massachusetts to his 
liking. He had opposed the gubernatorial candidacy of John Hancock in 
1780 without success., and the Hancock coalition, he felt, enjoyed a 
particularly favorable position. His constituency was growing rest-
less under duress of declining farm prices, and many of those imprisoned 
for debt were from the very towns he had represented in the Massachu-
62Ibid., XVII, 610, 752; XVIII, 961, 1000. 
63 
Ward to Samuel Adams, November 1781, Papers, R 3, V 5, fo 74,. 
66. 
setts General Courto · The policy adopted by the General Court 
invariably favored creditors against debtors, and the bill of January 
13, 1780 for paying arrears to the Continental army was the initial 
step of Massachusetts toward a general devaluation of the currency, 
65 which further alienated the'debtors of the stateo Finally, in 
September a bill devaluing the currency to a final ratio of 40/1 was 
66 passed., The people of Worcester County, beset by such an array of 
problems, returned Ward to the state House of Representatives in May, 
17820 
At the same time the United States was attempting to conclude a 
36 
peace with Great Britain, a situation developed in Massachusetts which 
Joseph Hawley, a member of the.Massachusetts supreme judicial court, 
described as of "greater magnitude" than any "affair since the Revo-
lution.1167 In April 1782, a group of disgruntled debtors led by 
Samuel Ely, a former minister, disrupted the courts in Northampton 
County, Massachusetts .. These men felt that the government, largely 
controlled by the Hancock coalition and seaboard interests, was dis-
criminating against them .. In ,July the General Court appointed Ward, 
Samuel Adams, and Nathaniel Gorham to deal with the problem. The 
64unsigned letter, December 14, 1780, Papers, R 4, P III, fs. 
327-328., Ward to Hancock, Dece~ber 9, 1778, ibido, R 3, V 5, f. 19. 
Ward's dislike for Hancock arose over what he felt was a misuse by 
Hancock of funds while he was President of the Harvard Board of Over-
seers., Richard B., Morris, "Insurrection in Massachusetts," Daniel 
Aaron, ed., Crisis in .America, (New York, 1952), PP• 21-49. 
65oscar and Mary Handlin, "Revolutionary Economic Policy in 
Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly, IV, (January, 1947), 3-26. 
661 bid~, 24-25. 
67 
Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, po 264. 
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committee explained the government's position during the early days of 
July at Hatfield, and by July 8 the insurgents declared their ill feel-
. b d 1 1 .. f . 68 1ng was ase arge yon m1s1n ormat1on. The violence of the mobs 
led by Ely attracted little attention but was important as a prelude 
to Shays's Rebellion of 1786-1787 because westerners were thereby con-
vinced that violence could help them reach their_political objectivesf9 
The grievances which gave birth to Shays's Rebellion existed be-
fore the critical period of 1786. The cost of the Revolution had put 
a severe strain'on the Massachusetts economy, and the tax burden was 
increasingly oppressive. The rising costs of a free market that sup-
plied provisions for the war was an added burden to soldiers and their 
families who had to live on fi_xed incomes, and the Revolution especial-
ly hurt farmers who had to live on fixed incomes, and the Revolution 
especially hurt farmers in the i,nterior counties where land holdings 
were small and access to markets difficult. In these areas cash was 
in acute shortage and taxes were particularly burdensome. 70 
After the war the interior .. counties continued to suffer most 
while debtors receiiled no relie.f · from their government. In Ward's home 
county of Worcester persons jailed as debtors rose in number from 
seven in March 1786 to sev_enty-two in December, and numbered among. 
them were some of the more renowned soldiers of the Revolution. 71 
68 Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, PP• 261-267. Hall, Politics 
without Parties, PP• 188-189. 
69Ibid. 
70 
Oscar and Mary Handlin, "Revolutionary Economic Policy in Massa-
chusetts," 3-26. 
71Morris, "Insurrection in Massachusetts," 240 
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Although seaboard counties enjoyed a disproportionate number of repre-
sentatives in both the House and the Senate, the tax burden fell heavi-
est upon the interior counties. In 1781 no change took place in items 
taxable on the seaboard, but new itemizations were made on the holdings 
), 
of interior farmers. With the adoption of the new state constitution 
in 1780 the proportion of taxes raised by assessments on real estate 
were lowered in favor of an increased poll tax. The result was that by 
1784 Worcester County, hard pressed for circulating currency, actually 
paid a greater amount in poll taxes than the county that included 
72 Boston. 
Ward's posture during Shays's Rebellion clearly suggested his 
great concern for social stability. Not only were most of the in-
surgents from towns which made,up his constituency, but some had 
served directly under his command in the earliest stages of the Revo-
lution. These were not people he would lightly offend. Within the 
context of Shays' s Rebellion, the meaning of republicanism and the 
nature of society as perceiv7d by Ward was more clearly shown. For 
73 most of the Whigs "repuQlicanism was not equated with democracy,". 
and Ward was included among that number. To Ward, like most Whigs, 
although sovereigrity'ultimately resided in the people, nothing was so 
much. feared as too much power handed to the people, for their licen-
. 74 
tiousness was well established. 
To Ward republicanism meant a mixed polity couched in a highly 
72Ibid., 27. 
73 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, P• 221. 
74Ibid., pp .. 404-405, 432. 
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structured hierarchy which ran from a high echelon of governing offi-
cials to a lower rung that included the people. Government worked best 
when set beyond the direct control of the people. To Samuel Osgood 
he confided that "political justice" was not always that which was sup-
ported by the people. Only a people first "well informed" and there-
75 fore virtuous, were capable of participation in government. And this 
76 participation extended only t_hrough election day. This gave the 
people a fair and adequate voice in government and at the same time 
protected the government from the licentiousness of an all-powerful 
77 people. As be understood republicanisfilWard's posture during Shays's 
Rebellion was consistent with his political thought. The maintenance 
of social stability for which he was concerned was not a denunciation 
of democracy but rather a solid stance for republicanism. Nor was it 
a repudiation of the Revolution. For Ward, like other Whigs, "colonial 
independence was not a democratic movement which dissolved all liga-
ments of subordination in colonial society and 'liberated the 
78 
people. 111 What independence did do, which was precisely what Ward 
intended that it shoµld do, was to transfer "allegiance from one set 
of magistrates to a slightly different set who happened to be called 
75 · . 
Ward to Samuel Osgood, March 31, 1781, quoted in Martyn, Life of 
Artemas Ward, P• 303. 
76 Ward to Benjamin Lincoln, April 23·, 1783, ibid., Original letter 
in Fogg Collection, Maine Historical Society._ "I am almost ready to 
say, that the choice of the first ma,gistrate ought by no means, be 
committed to the people at L~rge. I apprehend the inattention of the 
people is so great that there is a danger of their being undone before 
they are aware of it." 
77 Wood, The Creation of the .American Republic, PP• 404-405. 
78Richard Buel, "Democracy in the .American Revolution: A Frame of 
Reference," William and Mary Quarterly, ( 1964), XXI, 165-191. 
79 representatives of the people." 
40 
In August 1786 a host of conventions met throughout Massachusetts. 
These extralegal political gatherings had become common in the state 
after 1780 as the only way in which westerners in the state felt they 
80 could air their grievances against the government. On August 15, 
1786 a convention was called at Leicester, and delegates from thirty-
seven towns in Worcester County drafted a petition of grievances. The 
convention had two major complaints: high court fees and the heavy 
h h db 1 • d ff h I bl 0 • • 81 taxes tat a een ev1e to pay o testates pu 1c secur1t1es. 
Shrewsbury was not numbered among the towns that sent representatives 
for reasons which were penned by Ward. He believed that the conven-
tions held by the insurgents were unlawful and that they arose from 
"licentiousness, disappointed ambition, and disaffection to the free 
82 government." Although they were supported by many "honest but 
unthinking people," Ward believed that the conventions worked into the 
schemes of domestic and foreig"n foes who would destroy the common-
83 
wealth. Finally, he felt that such meetings were in violation of 
the constitution of Massachusetts, and he admonished all who were 
assembled to separate and "study to be quiet and do his own business.1184 
Not until October 1786, when the rebellion had reached a fevered 
79Ibid., 180. 
80Hall, Politics without Parties, PP• 179-184. 
81Forrest Mc.Donald, E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the Ameri-
can Republic 1776-1790 (B~ston, 1965~p. 145-146. - -
82unsigned, undated draft, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs. 182-183. 
83tbid. 
84unsigned, undated draft, Papers, R 3, V 5, fs. 182-183. 
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tempo, did the legislature make any meaningful attempt to inform the 
85 public concerning the measures it had adopted. At the same time the 
Court made their report and admitted that the lack of information was 
partially responsible for the rebellion, the Confederation Congress was 
raising forces obstensibly to use against the Indians but actually to 
quell the insurrection. Congress asked for an immediate augmentation 
of 1,340 troops for the protection of the frontier and to aid in sur-
veying western lands. These troops, raised principally from the New 
England states and consisting of infantry and artillery, were never 
86 
used. 
On September 6, at the request oft.he Justices of the Court of 
Common Pleas, Ward sent Governor James Bowdoin a brief account of the 
violence that had taken place in Worcester County, and stated that the 
violence was not subsided. 87 By December the government settled on 
the necessity of crushing the rebellion, and Ward was repeatedly con-
85 . · , 
- J. R. Pole, "Shays 's Rebellion: A Political Interpretation," 
The Reinterpretation of the .American Revolution 1763-1789 ed. Jack P. 
Greene, (New York, 1968), P• 422. 
86 . -
Undated letter, Papers, R 3, V 6, fs. 189-190. This letter was 
read and concurred to an October 27, 1786 in the House of Representa-
tives. 
87ward to James Bowdoin, September 6, 1786, ibid., R 3, V 5, 
f. 187. 
42 
1 d h b f 1 . h" h b" . 88 su te as tote est means o accomp is ing tat o Jective. No 
wonder then that the rebels selected Ward as a target for retaliation 
. h h h k f h · b 89 int e event tat t e government too any o t eir num er. 
On December 3, 1786 Governor Bowdoin informed Ward and the other 
members of the Court of Common Pleas that the insurgents were going to 
prevent the sitting of the courts in Worcester but that information had 
not been received in time to send militia. He gave the justices per-
90 
mission not to sit because of the imminent danger. The courts did 
not meet in January, but only because business could not be carried 
on as usual. Earlier in September Ward proved that he would not be 
intimidated. On ·Monday night of the first week of September, 1786 a 
group of rebels took control of the Worcester Court of Common Pleas. 
The following morning Ward met the challenge: 
I do not value your bayonets, you might plunge them into my 
heart; but while that heart beats I will do my duty; when 
opposed to it, my life is of little consequence; if you will 
take away your bayonets and give me some position where I can 
88James Bowdoin to Ward, December 14, 1786, Papers, R 3, V 5, f. 
216. Ward to James Bowdoiri, December 15, 1786, ibid., R 3, V 5, f. 193. 
The Governor's Executive,CounciL met on December 20, 1786 to ·consider 
the most effective means of crushing the revolt; in a letter to Ward 
the Governor asked for the General's advice on the "best plan for 
that purpose." Ward's response w;as that the conflict would be shorter 
and less severe if the government mustered a "decided superior force." 
It would, he felt, be necessary that the lower counties have a force 
double to that of the insurgents. This would serve as a "stimulus to 
the militia in this Co~nty to turn out support of government: this 
plan will convince the insurgents that they are not the people as they 
affect to call themselves." 
89John Avery to Artemas Ward, December 2, 1786, ibid., R. 3, V 5, 
f. 194. 111 am directed by the Governor to inform you that it was 
agreed on by Shays & others in consultation this or last week, that in 
case government took up any of them, they would retaliate on the friends 
of government and that you and Judge Gile were· agreed upon." 
90James Bowdoin to Worcester Court of Common Pleas, December 3, 
1786, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 196. 
be heard by my fellow citizens anq not by the leaders alone, 
who have deceived and deluded you, I will speak but not other-
wisee91 
Ward's duty, as he viewed it, was to the people-at-largee He did not 
believe that the leaders of the rebellion were the people to whom he 
had a duty, but he did choose ·to recognize a duty to those among the 
people who had been deceived. He knew that the people could often be 
misled "for want of consideration," and that when they were it was 
the duty of their representatives to "address them in a serious and 
92 solemn manner .. " He did address them for more than two hours but was 
unable to disperse the gathering .. The only recourse was force. On 
January 21, 1787 the state sent 4,400 men under Benjamin Lincoln, 
and the rebellion was crushed. 93 
The voting record of General Ward in the Continental Congress, 
and his stand for social stability during Shays's Rebellion clarified 
43 
his political posture8 He would not endanger the Massachusetts puritan-
republican social order by subservience either to France or to a strong 
Congress. Yet neither was he ready to allow that social order to be 
destroyed by the anarchy, 
91 · -
Epler, Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart, po 53. Ward, 
History of the Town of Shrewsbury, P• 96 .. 
92 Undated, unsigned letter, Papers, R 4, P II, f. 329, 
93 
Epler, Masterminds at the Commonwealth's Heart, pe 53. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FEDERAL PERIOD 
The first congressional. election under the new federal Constitu-
tion in 1788 indicated the extent to which Ward's popularity had waned 
as a result of his posture during Shays's Rebellibno Ordinarily popu-
lar among Worcester voters, he ran third in an election won by a per-
1 sonal enemy, Jonathan Grout, a lawyer from Petershamo Though not 
elected to Congress, he was made moderator in Shrewsbury and this, 
1 Jonathan Grout to Ward, October 26, 1786, Papers, R 3, V 6, fs., 
234-237 .. Proceedings of the House on Colonel Grout's motion, ibid., 
R 3, V 6, f. 232 .. Ward to Thomas Ward, December 1, 1791, ibido, R 3, 
V 6, f. 296., In a written accusation Grout accused Ward of a general 
misuse of the Speake;r's powers .. 11 ...... as Speaker you did last June de-
prive me of my privilege as a member~ of the House when speaking with 
your leave in ordering me to set down which was contrary to the rules 
and orders of the House and in _violation of the Constitution .. And when 
a certain matter had been before the House.,ooyou did then without any 
just cause, in an angry manner cross the floor and come to me with words 
unbecoming a gentleman .. .,oyour dignified station raised you so much 
above the powe~s of iour mind, as to cause you to forget the rules"of 
the House, the constitution and" the gentleman ... .,and did you not insinu-
ate ••• that I saideoothat I would go home raise a party to prevent the 
Court's sitting." Two reports accepted by the House exonerated Ward .. 
On March 7, 1787 the House concurred that, "the conduct of the Honor-
able Speaker on that as well as on every other occasion has been en-
tirely consistent with the rules and orders of the House and the"con-
stitution .. 11 Ahd that Grout's charges were "false and groundless." On 
June 6 a committee of nine declared that the order of March 7 was not 
an impeachment of the words "false and groundless," and that they 
should remain part of the Journal .. The matter was always one of con-
cern for Ward. On December 1, 1791 he wrote his son Thomas, "Grout's 
son is here and appears very sociable he came here last week he says he 
shall tarry here two or three weeks. I mean to treat him with pro-
priety and decency that he may have no just cause to say I treated him 
ill .. " 
44 
together with his farm, more than consumed his timeo 2 In the fall of 
1790 Grout ran for reelection, and again Ward opposed him. The first 
ballot of October 4 was indecisive, but a second vote on Nov~mber 26 
3 
gave the election to Ward .. 
The Second Congress uas important not only because it determined 
45 
answers to vital questions regarding the national interest, but because 
it also witnessed the growth of party cleavages. Indeed, two distinct 
voting blocs developed in the First Congress, and by the end of the 
Third Congress, both governmental questions and popular events were 
viewed from a partisan perspectiveo 4 Although the sectional lines grew 
less clear in the Fourth Congress, the two voting blocs retained their 
. . 1 . 1 h 5 origina sectiona c aractere The staunch Massachusetts Federalist 
Fisher Ames grew alarmed at the diversity which grew up in the First 
House and observed that men with local sympathies sometimes joined 
6 
Anti-federalists to defeat the purposes of governmento The issue that 
divided Ward and Ames was precisely how much power should be vested in 
the federal governmente T~is difference was complicated by the fact 
that it was not a party difference but rather one of experience. 
2 
Ward to H'enr'y Dana Ward, December 15, 17 89, Papers, R 3, V 6, f e 
278: "I have so many things to attend to at present that I stand in 
need of your assistance; if it was not indispensibly necessary I should 
not wish to call you from your studies." .. 
'. 
3worcester Distiict Vote Tabulation, November 26, 1790, ibido, f, 
287. Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, p., 301. 
4 
Mary P .. Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States Congress, 
1789 to 1796: A Quantitative Analysis," The William and Mary Quarterly, 
XXVIII, (1972), ppe 523-5420 
5rpid. 
6Fisher Ames to George Minot, June 23, July 8, 9, 1789, Ames, ed., 
Works of Fisher Ames., I, 56, 61, 62, 64e 
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Both were avowed New England F'ederalists, both had an aversion for the 
South which was identified as the main opposition to the a.dministration, 
and both held that government should not be left too much to the devices 
of the people. To Ames, Federalists were men determined to build a 
strong central government, men who could enlarge their strictly paro-
chial views to encompass the good of the entire country. Nor did he 
view his national sympathies as a betrayal of New England, for he felt 
7 
that what was best for the nation was best also for New Englando Ward 
believed in 1792, just as he had in 1776, that what was best for New 
England, particularly Massachusetts, was best for the general govern-
ment. 
The gulf that separated Ward and Ames was one that no amount of 
political debate or impassioned rhetoric could bridge. When Ward left 
his sick bed on that chilly April morning in 1775 it was to take com-
mand of a provincial army fighting for a provincial cause and not a 
continental army fighting a nationalist war. The original purpose 
of the war had been political separation from England and individual 
sovereignty for the several states. Ward had fought to preserve the 
Massachusetts-puritan-republican social order, and it remained as dear 
to him in 1800 as it had in 1776. Ward grew to political maturity 
during th~ Revolution, and the socio-political ideas of the period 
remained a life-long part of his thought. Then too, Ward's political 
experience to 1780 had been provincial. Ames, on the other hand, saw 
only brief service in the Revolution, most of which came after Massa-
chusetts was no longer the main theater of the war, and he had virtually 
7Winford E. Aa Bernhard, Fisher Ames: Federalist and Statesman 
1758-1808e (Chapel Hill, 1965), PP• 93-101~ 
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no political experience whatever, outside of his law practice, until he 
was named a delegate to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention in 1787. 8 
Therefore it is not surprising that parochial politics and section-
al interests swayed Ward more than they did Ames. Essentially both men 
wanted what was best for New England and the country as a whole; the 
difference came over how this could best be realized. Ames saw "how 
much power this government needs and how little is given it," but his 
was a vision Ward did not share with him. 9 The conflict between Ward 
and Ames came most often where questions of the military, government 
i 
expense, or centralization were involved.lo (See Table II,) 
Ward's position as a Federalist in the Second and Third Congresses 
was not inconsistent with his political thought, nor was it indicative 
of a change in attitude from the earlier period of the Revolution and 
Confederation. Federalism was a sectional expression as well as a 
political one, and it was this sectional aspect plus his concern for 
social stability that endeared to him the principles that came to be 
called Federalism. 11 Ward cou.ld vote for centralist policies only when 
12 
they were compatible with the interests of New England. 
8 
Bernhard, Fisher Ames, PP• 3-56. 
9Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight,.January 23, 1792, Ames, Works of 
Fisher Ames, I, 110. 
lOMy analysis but .based on the research and data of Professor H. 
James Henderson. 
11 James M. Banner, Jr., To the Hartford Convention, P• 22: "Feder-
alism offered a social ideal which emphasized stability, tradition, de-
pendence, and the common good ••• The party won the adherence of all sorts 
of men: the high and low, western farmer and eastern merchant, Boston 
deist and Connecticut Valley Calvinist, the learned and the ignorant.". 
12Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, P• 30; " ... but it was solely and 
specifically for the political liberty of his own province of Massachu-
setts, that, nineteen years before he had risked life and honor by head-
ing a revolutionary army." 
TABLE II 
WARD'S DISAGREEMENT WITH FISHER AMES IN CONGRESS 
DATE 
Jan 25, ;1792 
Jan 30, 1792 
Jan 30, 1792 
Mar 6, 1792 
Mar 27, 1792 
Mar 27, 1792 
Apr 4, 1792 
Apr 10, 1792 
May 4, 1792 
Jan 8, 1793 
Jan 8, 1793 
Jan 15, 1793 
Jan 15, 1793 
ISSUE 
Provision for new enumeration and 
reapportionment on Mar 1, 1797 
Strike provision in bill for 
protection of the frontier that 
provided for 3 additional regi-
ments of infantry 
Shall Congress provide 3 additional 
regiments 
Bill providing for a uniform milita 
President of the United States re-
que~ted to investigate the failure 
of General Arthur St. Clair's 
expedition 
A committee to investigate General 
St. Clair's failure 
Indemnify estate of late General 
Greene on the publiG behalf 
Engrossed bill to' indemnify 
General Greene 
Bill for settling demands of Anthony 
w • .White against the United States 
Wording of motio_n reducing the mili-
tary establishment of the United 
States 
Shall the military be reduced? 
Shall the petition of the merchants 
of Charleston be considered by 
Congress 
Should the petition of the merchants 








































Jan 25, 1793 
Jan 21, 1794 
Jan 21, 1794 
Feb 14, 1794 
Dec 4, 1794 
Shall the loan program to the 
states begin January 1, 1794? 
Strike out provision that com-
missioned officers who stay in 
the army shall receive half pay 
Pension for families of deceased 
officers up to half pay of a 
Lt. Col. 
Unfair election (Delaware) Henry 
Latimer is to replace John Patton 
Congression vote of thanks to 
Major General Anthony Wayne for 






Source: Annals of Congress, 2nd Congress, 1791-1793, 335, 354-355, 
435, 493, 537, 550, 594, 802, 823, 824, 843-844. 3rd Congress, 1793-
1795, 254, 454, 763 ,' 965. 
"There are matters b.efore Congress of very great importance," Ward 
reported to his son Thomas, "such as the Indian war, representation in 
Congress, whether one for every thirty thousand, &c, militia law &c. 
I wish they may all be determined in such manner as will be most for 
13 the benefit of the people at large." One of the first of these 
issues to concern the Second Congress was the ratio of representatives 
in the House. This issue promoted sectional polarization, reflected 
regional population expections, and proved potent in promoting partisan-
13 Ward to Thomas w. Ward, January 23, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 298. 
50 
h . 14 s 1.p. 
The Constitution had fixed the number of representatives at a total 
of sixty-five, a specified number from each state. A constitutional 
amendment 'to set the ratio of representatives at one for every 30,000 
inhabitants had not been ratified by the states, and it became the task 
of the lower branch of the legislature to settle the issue .. On Monday, 
October 31, 1791 John Laurance of New York proposed that the ratio for 
representatives be one for every 30,00o. 15 
The South generally favored this ratio because those five states 
expected the population balance ultimately to shift drastically in their 
favor .. William Findley of Pennsylvania believed that a large repre-
sentation would better win the confidence of the people for the govern-
ment, and that they would gladly bear the additional expense to safe-
guard their freedom. 16 The standard anti-Federalist argument was that 
the larger the representation the less likely that government would sub-
vert the liberties of the people. Virginia's William Giles argued that 
only an increase in the number of the House would prevent the formation 
of legislative aristocracy in that body, and that only numerous repre-
sentatives could balance the government against the strong executive 
17 
branch that had been created.. John Page, also of Virginia, con-
tended that the smaller ratio would give the people the fullest voice 
14 Mary P. Ryan, "Party Formation in the United States Congress," 
P• 538. 
1~ 1Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the 
United States," Annals of the Congress of the United States, (Washing-
ton: 1849), 2nd Congress, 1791-1793, III, 147 .. Hereinafter cited as 
Annals of Congress .. 
16 Annals of Congress, III, 177-178e 
17Ibid .. , 179 .. 
in their government consistent with its nature. He explained that 
only a large representation in the National Assembly of France had 
made possible the Constitution of 17910 18 
Argument for the smaller ratio was not confined to the southern 
representatives .. Elbridge Gerry, a Massachusetts Federalist at the 
time, pointed out that the states had decreased the number of repre-
sentatives in their state legislatures in the expectation of enlarging 
the number of representatives in the federal governmente To those who 
pointed to the ineffectiveness of the large state assemblies, he 
replied that the weakness lay in the method of election rather than 
the mere number; to those who feared that a large House would impinge 
upon the Senate he maintained that the Constitution had thoroughly 
51 
guaranteed the independence of that bodyo In his final remarks he com-
pared the government to a pyramid and hoped that the House would give 
. .d . b d h b 0 d b·1· 19 it a wi e representative ase an t ere y provi e sta i ityo 
When the vote was taken on November 15, 1791 both Ward and Ames 
voted against the majority of Congress in establishing the smaller 
ratio. 20 The Senate returned the bill with an amended ratio of one 
representative for every 33,000 inhabitants, which reduced th~ number 
I 
of representatives in some states, mainly southern, but because of 
fractions allowed for population over 16,500, some states, mainly 
h · d h · · · 1 b 21 nort ern, retaine t eir origina num ero 
18Ibid., 182. 
19 Annals of Congress, III, 191-192 .. 
20Ibid., 121 .. 
21 
Bernhard, Fisher Ames, P• 189e 
Both Ward and Ames sup-
52 
ported the Senate amendment • .Ames argued that the original ratio would 
give Virginia twenty-one representatives when that state was entitled 
to only nineteene He indicated that according to the census 112 repre-
sentatives would be called for at the ratio of one to thirty thousand • 
.Ames reckoned that with a population of 630,000 Virginia would have 
twenty-one.representatives, while the states of Vermont, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware, with a total popu-
lation of 766,000, would have a total representation only iqual to that 
f V. . . 22 0 1. rg1.n1.ae 
The debate then turned to residual population elements that would 
be left unrepresented by the proposed ratioso .Ames took pains to con-
vince the House that the ratio of one for every 33,000 would provide a 
more equitable distribution of the represe~tatives chosen. 23 He was 
willing to accept the Senate amendment because as proposed Massachu-
setts would have sixteen of thirty-five New England representatives 
and Virginia would have only twenty-one of the House on March 23, 1792 
24 by a margin of two votese The Senate amendment finally passed the 
House'on March 23, 1792 by a margin of two votes. 25 On April 9, how-
ever, the bill was back in the House with a veto message attachede 
Washington's objections to the bill were twofold: the Constitution, 
he noted, provided that representatives would be apportioned among the 
states according to their :respective numbers, and that no divisor gave 
22 · 
Annals of Congress, III, 2570 
23 b"d I 1. •' 259, 262. 
24 
Bernhard, Fisher .Ames, P• 191e 
25 
Annals of Congress, III, 482, 4830 
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the number of representatives proposed by the bill. He further objected 
because the bill gave a smaller ratio than one to thirty thousand to 
. h 26 eig t states. 
New England representatives attempted unsuccessfully to pass the 
bill over the President's veto on April 60 Finally, three days later, 
the House passed an apportionment bill with the ratio of one repre-
sentative for every 33,000 inhabitants without the enlarged represen-
. f h 'h 27 tation or t e eig t states. This left Massachusetts with fourteen 
. d v· . . . 28 representatives an gave irginia nineteen. 
The sectional nature of the issue was shown by the fact that of the 
entire representation from New England only Elbridge Gerry of Massa-
chuseets, and .Amasa Learned and Jeremiah Wadsworth from Connecticut, 
consistently supported the smaller ratio, while in the South support 
for the smaller ratio was virtually unanimous. 29 Ward's objection to 
the smaller ratio was that it would increase the expense of government 
without making the efforts of Congress more effective. He surmised 
that a large number of representatives could not be easily watched 
30 
by the people. No doubt Ward believed that a smaller number of 
representatives would do the work of Congress more efficiently, but 
his well established aversion for the South, and the jealousy with 




29 Data of Professor Henderson. 
30ward to Henry Dana Ward, February 22, 1792, R 3, V 6, 304-305. 
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reasoningo 
The disastrous defeat of General Arthur St& Clair by Indians in the 
Northwest in 1791 alarmed the country, and drew the attention of Cong-
ress away from the question of representatione Early in 1792 the House 
met as a committee of the whole and began consideration of a bill to 
provide adequate protection for the frontier. Debate on the bill 
centered around section two, which provided for an augmentation of 
3,040 troops, consisting of three infantry regiments and one squadron 
of light dragoonse The additional force, many argued, was unnecessary 
because the Indians could easily be appeased by moderation and justice. 
It was pointed out that the Indians attacked only when grievously 
wronged by encroaching white settlers and never pursued their advantage 
into white territoryo Some in Congress favored what they felt was a 
wiser and less costly policy of appeasement~ They contended that the 
Indians could not be defeated so long as the British maintained posts 
in the Northwest and believed that if whites would stay off Indian 
lands the problem would solve itselfe 31 
The bill for the protection of the frontier further illustrated 
the parochial leanings of Ward, and the nationalist sentiment of Ames. 
As a proponent of the bill ..Ames argued that the additional force was 
necessary not only to protect the lives of western settlers but to 
preserve respect for the national government. 32 Ever parochial in 
attitude, Ward was largely unconcerned about the Northweste At any 
rate, if a real Indian problem existed it was the problem of western 
31 Annals of Congress, III, 337-338a 
32Bernhard, Fisher ..Ames, po 1940 
se~tlers, not the national government. Nevertheless, the bill passed 
33 Congress on February 1, substantially as proposed. Ward commented 
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that the additional force was unnecessary, and therefore constituted a 
34 needless ·expense. The Indians of the Northwest continued to be ~ 
problem, but by November Ward believed that the prospects for a 
general treaty of peace with the Indians had greatly improved. The 
Indians, he explained, had spent too much time at war, this haq dis-
rupted their trade with the British, and.hence both the Indians and 
• 35 the British were more prone toward peace. In December Ward's hope 
for peace with the northwest Indians was even more optimistic, and he 
believed that a treaty was forthcoming. 36 By February of the following 
year he told Thomas that the reports of fighting between .American 
forces and Indians were unsubstantiated, and that he was not even 
37 certain that an expedition had been sent out. However, the Indian 
problem continued.to bother Congress until the expedition of General 
Anthony Wayne in August 1794. 
Also related to defense was the bill introduce.a by Jeremiah 
Wadsworth for the establishment of a uniform militia. 38 The debate 
again was heated. Jonathan Sturges of Connecticut believed that some 
33 Annals of Congress, III, 355. 
3 \fard to Thomas w. Ward, March 1, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 307. 
35ward to Thomas w. Ward, November 13, 1792, ibid., R 3, V.6, f. 320. 
36ward to Thomas w. Ward., December 28, 1792, ibid., R 3, v 6, f. 326. 
37ward to Thomas w. Ward, February 22, 1792, ibid., R 3, v 6, fs. 
304-305. 
38 of Annals Congress, III, 200. 
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amendment was needed for the first section of the bill because as 
worded the militia became a federal force, which he conceived to be 
in violation of the principles of the Constitution. He reasoned that 
only the states were empow1=red to determine who should serve, and who 
I 
should be exempt from mili~ia service. 39 No explicit statement exists 
among Ward's correspondence to account for why he voted against this 
bill, but his parochial outlook, his fear of a strong military, and a 
distrust of centralism, were probably deciding considerations. 
On March 27, 1792 William Giles of Virginia proposed that 
President Washington initiate an investigation to discover the reasons 
for the defeat of General Sto Clair. 40 This proposal failing by a vote 
of 35 to 21, an alternative resolution was introduced by which a House 
committee should investigate the defeat of General St. Clair. The 
latter resolution passed by a large majority, with Fisher Ames being 
one of the repres~ntatives against it. Ward split with Ames on both 
' 
votes. Ames viewed both resolutions as an affront to the administra-
tion, while Ward, with an ingrained distrust of the military, believed 
that it should be watchedo 
Ward again split with .Ames on the issue of whether to indemnify 
the estate of the late General Nathaneal Greeneo Major General Greene 
bound himself to pay h8,743 for supplies received from Charleston 
merchants in April 1783 to supply the southern army .. He settled the 
debt in 1786 with :b8,688 from his own funds. On February 22, 1792 the 
39rbid., 418-419, and 1392. The bill as finally approved provided 
that every able-bodied white male of the states between the ages of 18 
and 45 should serve in the militia, and that members of Congress and 
certain other government officials were exempt from duty. 
40 Annals of Congress, IIIt 490. 
House began consideration of a resolution to indemnify the deceased 
41 general's estate. 
The debate in Congress centered around whether Greene's purchase 
had actually been made on behalf of the public interest or whether he 
57 
was in partnership with the Charleston merchants at the time he bought 
the supplies. Abraham Baldwin of Georgia could not produce evidence 
to prove conclusively that Greene had not entered a partnership but 
pointed to the high character of the general as sufficient testimony 
for the validity of the claim. John Steele of North Carolina argued 
that only evidence admissable in a regular court of justice should 
b 1 . h h 1 . . f h 1 · 42 esta is t e egitimacy o t e c aim. .Ames voted for the in-
demnification while the parsimonious and anti-militarist Ward opposed 
the indemnification of Greene's estate. 
Consistently Ward voted against all congressional measures which 
provided federal benefits for soldiers. On January 21, 1794 he voted 
to strike a provision in a military bill which provided for half pay 
for commissioned officers who stayed in the army, and on the same day 
he rejected a bill which provided for pensions for families of de-
ceased soldiers. 43 
As a provincial commander Ward had been paid by Massachusetts, 
and he viewed it as the responsibility of the states to pay their 
militia and thereby maintain adequate control over them. Parochialism 
alone did not account for Ward's position against federal provision for 
41 Annals of Congress, III, 424. 
42Ibid., 454. 
43Ibid., IV, 253-2550 
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the army. He opposed the creation of a uniform militia largely 
because this would take the control of the militia out of the hands 
of the states. Perhaps the presence of British troops in Boston in 
the period just before the Revolution made Ward acutely sensitive to 
the dangers of a national military force. Certainly the dangers of 
such a force were apparent to him, for he twice voted for reduction 
f h ·1· 44 o t e mi 1.tary. 
Ward's high voting agreement with the Federalists in the Second 
and Third Congresses implies that he wanted a government with adequate 
power to enforce its policies, but his disagreements also make it 
clear that the dangers inherent in an all-powerful central government 
were equally apparent to him. Then too, there were simply some mat-
ters Ward felt naturally fell within the competence: of the state, 
rather than the nation. On January 15, 1793 he voted against a reso-
lution of Congress to consider a petition of Charleston merchants for 
1 · d d · h 45 osses susta1.ne ur1.ng t e war. The merchants complained that they 
were suffering under the terms of the fourth article of the Treaty of 
Paris, which required them to pay their British debts in sterling money 
with full interest. The merchants felt this unfair and begged relief 
46 from Congress. These debts were contracted previous to the Revolu-
tion, and Ward believed that they should be paid. This attitude 
stemmed from no partiality toward Britain. His aversion for the South, 
his strict belief that debts should be paid, and the fact that these 




terms had been agreed to between th~ United States and Great Britain 
probably caused this feeling. 
Ward's attitude toward the British, as manifested by the debate 
on Jay's Treaty, and toward the French as indicated by his view of the 
French Revolution, further identified his differences with high 
Federalists, and proved conclusively that he never wholly divested 
himself of the spirit of '76. Just after the close of the Third 
Congress Jay's Treaty was received in the United States. When the 
full text of the treaty, as ratified by the Senate, became public the 
outcry from the emerging Republican opposition was quick and vocifer-
ous. 
Ward was among those who did not particularly like the treaty but 
believed that some kind of treaty with the British was desirable, and 
that no better one could be obtained. He confessed that llthere are 
things in the treaty I. could wish. were otherwise,". but also realized 
that it was not "possible to have them otherwise. 1147 He explained to 
his son Henry D~na Ward that the tteaty would not last forever, that 
the conunercial benefits of the treaty were as good as those obtained 
from the earlier treaty with Franc~ and that thosi most ardently 
opposed to the treaty were simply alarmed at the prospect of having to 
pay their British debts. 48 He admonished his son to "endeavor to en-
lighten the dark minds of your legi.slators so far as you can with 
49 prudence." . 
47 
Ward to Henry Dana Ward, undated, Papers, R 5, Unbound corres-




Ward's support of Jay's Treaty did not stem from anti-French senti-
ment. He celebrated every step the French took toward a republican form 
of government .. He approved the French Constitution of 1791 though he 
did not believe that it was granted by the generosity of Louis xvr .. 50 
The vital aid the French had afforded the United States during the 
American Revolution perhaps made him reluctant to abandon them in their 
hour of upheaval and confusiono He noted to Thomas that the French, 
"not knowing how to use their rights turn their rage on their best 
friends 9 1151 yet the next month he rejoiced at the success of the 
French against the combined armies of Austria and Prussiao 52 
Ward's actions toward both the English and French were motivated 
by a desire to ensure that the United States acted independently from 
Europe .. The presidential electton of 1796 prompted him to observe 
that "federal men" were needed in the executive branch and to hope 
that no one would be elected "so frenchified as some of the charac-
ters to the southward are., We are an independent nation," he told 
Henry Dana Ward," and we ought to act like one., 1153 Earlier, while 
serving in the Continental Congress, Ward had been equally vehement in 
opposition to French control of American policy .. There had been those 
in Congress who we're ready to exchange American sovereignty in return 
50 · Annals .2!. Congress, III, 458. Ward concurred with the House 
resolution that received the news of the French Constitution with 
high satisfaction but voted against the section that referred to the 
"magnanimity" of its acceptance by the French king .. 
51ward to Thomas W .. Ward, November 13, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f., 
320. 
52ward to Thomas Wo Ward, December 28, 1792, ibid.,, R 3, V 6, f,.326 .. 
53ward to Henry Dana Ward, October 10, 1796, ibid.,, Unbound cor-
respondence, fs .. 133-134., 
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for financial and military aid, but Ward steadfastly opposed all such 
efforts. Neither the monarchical system of the British government nor 
the licentious anarchy of the French Republic fitted Ward's ideal of 
the perfect republic. 
Ward's party affiliation was not strong until after the division 
of opinion caused by the French Revolution and the debate on Jay's 
Treaty .. At the end of his first term in Congress he still believed 
54 
that if there were "more independent men we should do much better .. ". 
The intense attacks launched in the press by both par.ties strengthened 
party cohesiveness and unityo By 1796 Ward not only believed it imper-
ative to have John Adams and Thomas Pinckney in the two highest offices 
but regretted that the Federalists did not enjoy a House majority in 
55 the Fourth Congresse When the information that Edmund Randolph had 
apparently solicited funds from the French for political purposes while 
Secretary of State became public, Ward happily rejoined that the 
"Jacobins who were forever declaiming against the Federalists, saying 
they were influenced by British Gold," were silenced, and that "now 
we may conjecture with a good deal of certainty who would receive 
foreign bribes. 1156 
54ward to Thomas Wo Ward, March 1, 1792, Papers, R 3, V 6, f. 3070 
55ward to Dwight Foster, March 1, 1796, quoted in Martyn, Life of 
Artemas Ward, P• 317 .. 
56 ·· Letter quoted in Martyn, Life of Artemas Ward, PP• 317-3180 
The incident had to do with an intercepted letter from the French 
Minister in which Randolph had putportedly solicited a large sum of 
money from the French at the time of the Whiskey Rebellion to pay the 
debts of four influential men he believed were needed to prevent civil 
war in the United States but who could not act for fear of their 
British creditors .. 
62 
The period of Ward's service in the Second and Third Federal 
Congresses proved the consistency of his thought, and brought about a 
slight change in his political posture. His attachment to the Massa-
chusetts puritan~republican social order, his parochial views, garnered 
from long experience in provincial politics, his aversion to ~he South, 
and Congregationalist religious ideas continued to affect his political 
thought as they had throughout his public career. The Artemas Ward of 
1796 was different only in that the public rancor over treatment of 
the French and Jay's Treaty had intensified his cormnitment to a party 
that promised order rather than chaos. 
CHAPTER V 
THE POLITI.CAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARTEMAS WARD 
"I hope you will endeavor to get the good will of the people 
among whom you reside," Ward wrote his son Henry Dana Ward, "but in 
order to obtain that I hope you will not sacrifice your political 
I 
principles, nor your religion .. 111 He reflected that a "steady firmness 
to right principles is more likely to raise a man in the opinion of 
others than shifting about like a weathercock with every breath of 
wind .. 112 This statement, which seems at first glance to be no more 
than the moral admonition of a loving father, is actually an accurate 
and complete statement of Ward's political philosophy, for the political 
principles to which he referred were in reality a rigid set of moral 
beliefs, lifted directly from scripture, interpreted literally, and 
applied to politics. This one simple and straightforward statement 
embodied the entire scenario of his political strategy from his earli-
est appointment to mi.nor civic duties in Shrewsbury, to the end of his 
career in the Federal Congress .. 
The civil law of the province of Massachusetts was based upon 
1 
Ward to Henry Dana Ward, March 3, 1795, Papers, R 5, Unbound cor-
respondence, f. 126 and ibid., February 25, 1795, f. 123: "I wish 
to have you obtain the esteem of the people among whom you dwell; but 
to obtain that I would not have you renounce the New England Politic 
or Religion .... ". I 
2 
Ward to Henry Dana Ward, March 3, 1795, ibid .. , R 5, "Unbound 
correspondence, f .. 126 .. 
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Biblical injunctions, and a breach of civil law therefore often in-
valved an act that was in violation of scripture as well. During his 
long tenure as justice of the peace in Worcester County Ward was quick 
to punish swearing, and often levied the maximum fine permitted under 
law; he punished Sabbath breaking, adultery and any other violation 
of moral or Biblical law quickly and harshly. 
Ward's daily orders at Cambridge proved that by 1775 his moral and 
political principles had become so enmeshed as to be one. Morality 
and politics had become synonymouso This remained the case throughout 
his life, for he never discussed politics apart from religiono I.t was 
characteristic that he believed the political ineptitude of the South 
to be based more upon a lack of virtue and religion than on inadequate 
political experience. In 1781, after the main thrust of the war had 
shifted to the South, Ward observed that "if there was a more general 
execution to the southward of the Delaware River,".and a "more true 
fear of God,".that "we should have more reason to expect the blessing 
3 of heaven.". He feared that his generation like the "stiff necked 
Israelites of old" might be "made to wander in the wilderness until 
the rebellious generation were gone"· before the "spirit of liberty 
and righteousness will flourish on this continent in the manner wished 
4 for." He believed that only if "there was that attention to Virtue 
and Religion there ought to be" would there be a hope for "Divine favor, 
5 from the calamities we now flel .. 11 . 
3 \Ward to Thomas W .. Ward, April 6, 
4 Undated, unsigned letter, ibid .. , 
5 Undated, unsigned letter, ibid .. , 
1781, Pa:eers, R 3, V 5, fs.53-54. 
R 4, PIII, f .. 329 .. 
R 4, PIII, f .. 329 .. 
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Those who held political office, Ward felt, should be "sensible, 
religious men," and that man who "makes a mock of all religion" should 
6 
be avoided as one's "greatest adversaryo" The election of virtuous 
men was imperative, for the people often "run into excesses for want of 
consideration," and not to have men in government to "bring them to a 
sense of their duty" would result in a "general corruption of morals. 117 
Shays's Rebellion was a perfect example of what could happen if the 
"honest but unthinking people" were led by men without religious prin-
. 1 8 
Cl.p eo 
The principal ingredients of his political philosophy, which were 
the logical outgrowth of a convergence of puritanism, Whiggism, paro-
chialism, and the ethnocentric nature of Massachusetts society, were 
I 
instilled in Ward before he was thirty years old, and remained virtu-
ally unchanged throughout his long public careero His ancestry went 
back to the earliest ·ays of the Connnonwealth, and his family had long 
been prominent in the province. Well educated, he easily assumed many 
of his father's civic duties as judge, selectman and moderatoro He 
thoroughly accepted the social and political nature of Massachusetts 
society and was never able to give up the idea that what was best for 
Massachusetts was best for the nation. 
He reached his political majority during the Revolution and had a 
deep-rooted connnitment to republicanism, but republicanism as he under-
6 Ward to Thomas We Ward, December 14, 1780, Papers, R 4, P III, 
fs. 327-328. 
7unsigned, undated letter, ibido, R 5. Unbound correspondence, 
f. 130. 
8 
Ward on extra-legal political conventions.-, August 9, 1786, R 3, 
V 5, fs. 182-1830 
stood it involved a hierarchical political order in which the people 
figured as the lowest rung of the ladder. The post-Revolutionary 
political turmoil did not significantly alter his posture except 
where party affiliation was concerned. When he retired from national 
life in 1796 he remained committed to the same socio-political ideas 
he had learned during the Revolution, but the numerous outbreaks of 
violence had deepend his attachment to the one party that promised 
order. 
Much of his concern for social stability was evident as early as 
April, 1775 when he took command of provincial forces at Cambridge. 
His daily orders seem unusual unless viewed from the vantage point of 
his belief in the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order, for 
the orders often went beyond the p~re exigencies of the war. While 
acting as commander-in-chief he discouraged camp followers, meted out 
punishment for swearing, and made church attendance mandatory. The 
Revolution had for Ward a "utopian depth" that removed it from the 
realm of pure politics and added a "moral dimension" that involved 
the "very character of colonial society. 119 
The "Christian Sparta" in which Ward believed as strongly as 
66 
Samuel Adams, was dependent on the virtue of the people, and the func-
tion of government was to develop virtue aqd safeguard it against 
monarchical corruption on the one hand,· and from the licentiousness of 
the people on the other. The puritan social order of the province of 
Massachusetts had been as close to the Christian Sparta as British 
authority would allow, and Ward's participation in the Revolution had 
9Richard Buel, "Democracy in the .American Revolution: A Frame of 
Reference," The William and Mary Quarterly, (1964), XXI, 165-191. 
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been to preserve rather than change that structure. Civil disturbances 
which came in the wake of the Revolution were as much feared by him as 
British tyranny, for the tyranny of licentiousness was no better than 
the tyranny of governmento 
This dual fear of an over-concentration of power and utter chaos 
goes far in explaining Ward's political postureo It explains, for 
instance, why he could take up arms aga;J,nst the British over what he 
conceived to be economic and political injustices, and at the same time 
resist changes in unfair economic practices in Massachusetts in 1786-
1787. It explains why he saw no inconsistency between supporting the 
committees of correspondence during the colonial period and denying 
the legitimacy of the extta~legal political conventions held in Massa-
chusetts in the early 1780's. And most of all it explains why he 
could vote with Samuel Adams one hundred per cent of the time in the 
Continental Congress, and agree with the high Federalist Ames more than 
eighty per cent of the time in the Federal Congresso Ward's concern for 
the preservation of the Massachusetts puritan-republican social order 
caused him to act in concert with Samuel Adams while the social order 
was threatened by British authority and in concert with Ames when he 
perceived the danger to be from too little governmento 
This fear further accounts for his disagreement with the Feder-
alists on certain issues, for an overcentralization of power in the 
federal government was conceivably as great a danger as British authori-
ty had been. Neither fear of the people nor his military experience 
during the Revolution inclined Ward toward centralism, and in this 
respect he was different from ardent nationalists who viewed extensive 
central power as the only effective bridle against anarchy, and from 
68 
military cotnmanders of the Revolution who had witnessed the ineffective-
ness of a government without power. In both the Continental and Feder-
al Congresses Ward consistently voted against measures that promised 
to enlarge the powers of the Congress and national control over the 
states; On the few occasions when he did vote for centralizing poli-
cies he did so because he saw direct benefits for Massachusetts. 
One of the few instances in which Ward voted differently from the 
New England bloc in the Continental Congress was on the issue of a five 
per cent duty on imports to be levied by Congress. He believed that 
Massachusetts was carrying more than its weight in sponsoring the war 
effort and saw in the measure direct relief for his state .. Under no 
circumstances, however, was he persuaded to support Robert Morris or 
the office he occupied, the Bank of North America, congressional con-
trol of interstate commerce, or land distribution to the states. 
For two terms in the Federal Congress Ward maintained this 
strictly parochial position. He consistently voted against measures 
such as the uniform militia bill, and the bill for the protection of 
the frontier, because thes.e k,inds. bf policies promised to concentrate 
power in the hands of the federal government .. Again, his high support 
of administration policy stemmed from his belief that· the interests 
of Massachusetts were happily aligned with those of the nation. His 
support for the bill providing for federal loans to the states was 
prompted by his belief that such a bill held positive benefits for 
Massachusetts .. 
Ward's views on representation and the social order perhaps best 
indicated how his political philosophy worked when applied to a con-
crete situation, and illustrate what he conceived to be the nature of 
69 
the society in which he lived. Ward believed that the people might 
not, in every instance, be fit to elect their representatives. This 
attitude, though caused in part by the fact that John Hancock had won 
the state gubernatorial race, was a common tenet of eighteenth century 
Whiggish thought. The representative was not supposed to be "an aver-
age man who reflected the defects as well as the virtues of his con-
stituents," but he was supposed to be the "best man, the wisest and 
most virtuous. 1110 Therefore it was necessary that the people should 
sometimes adjust themselves to their representatives' views. Not to do 
so would be to surrender power to the least capable and deprive society 
of those most suited to govern. The power that was reserved to the 
people was not to be used to "express their will but to defend them 
f . 1111 rom oppression. 
Given these generally accepted views of republicanism and the 
place of the people in the eighteenth ~entury social order, Ward's 
\,, 
political thought appears bot,h consistent and typical. His alignment 
with Samuel Adams in the Continental Congress and with Fisher Ames in 
the Federal Congress merely illustrate the consistency of his political 
thought. His greatest concern throughout the Revolution, Confedera-
tion, and early Federal periods was to preserve the Massachusetts 
puritan-republican social order. 
The numerous stands he too~ for social stability in the postwar 
years were no contradiction of republican principles as he understood 
them. His duty as he perceived it was to take the side of government 
/___. ________ _ 
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against anarchy. Republican government meant social stability, and the 
people had no more right to impede the function of government than 
government had to suppress the liberties of the people. The people had 
responsibilities as well as rights. A well informed and virtuous 
people had a right to express themselves at the polls, but at that 
point their rights ended and their responsibilities began. Their 
obligation was to support government--they might dis,gree, but the 
time and the place for disagreement were fixed by law. 
Ward's political thought remained consistent throughout his life; 
it was circumstance that changed. What was needed to preserve the 
Massachusetts puritan-republican social order in 1775 was revolution, 
and Ward became a rebel. The Revolution, however, was fought to pre-
serve, not change, the social order. The turbulence of the postwar 
years were a threat to that order, and Ward reacted by taking a solid 
stand for order and government. His voting record in the Continental 
and Federal Congresses as well as his alignment with Samuel Adams and 
Fisher Ames speaks to the consistency of his concern for the social 
order that meant so much to him and which he conceived to be the 
perfect republic. 
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